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A RESTITUTIONARY THEORY OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS
Charles Silvert
Issues regarding attorneys' fees in class actions consumed an
extraordinary amount of federal judges' time in the 1980s.1 The
Supreme Court shouldered its share of the burden,2 by addressing
the following questions, among others: Is it proper to negotiate the
merits and attorneys' fees simultaneously when settling class ac-
tions?3 Can a class action settlement waive the right to a fee award
in a fee-shifting case? 4 Should the amount of money a class receives
affect the size of the fee an attorney is paid?5 Should private attor-
neys and legal aid attorneys who run class actions be paid at the
same rates?6 Can judges enhance fee awards to offset the risk of
losing and forfeiting all compensation when attorneys wage class ac-
tions on a contingency basis?7
t Assistant Professor, University of Texas Law School. J.D. Yale, 1987; M.A. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1982.
Samuel Issacharoff and Douglas Laycock read and critiqued several drafts of this
Article, and I thank them for their help and advice. Neal Devins, John Dzienkowski,
Richard Epstein, Robert Hamilton, Calvin Johnson, Charles Johnson, Lewis Korn-
hauser, Richard Posner, Jack Ratliff, and Marsha Silver also provided written comments
and other valuable assistance. I am also grateful for suggestions from Mark Gergen,
Steven Goode, William Powers, Louise Weinberg, and the rest of my colleagues who
attended a colloquium I offered at the University of Texas Law School. Finally, I wish to
acknowledge research assistance from Jane Enzminger, John Fahle, and Veronique
Kellow.
1 See, e.g., HERBERT B. NEWBERG, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS (1986 & Supp. Dec. 1990)
(survey of recent cases); E. Richard Larson, Recent Developments in the Law of Attor-
neys' Fees (Nov. 16-19, 1989) (paper presented at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Law-
yers Training Institute; available from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
2 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986
Terms: Economics, Ethics, and Ex Ante Analysis, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 621, 621 (1988)
("Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has progressed from hearing an occasional
case on attorney fee awards to deciding at least a few such cases virtually every Term.")
(footnote omitted). Not all fee-related cases decided by the Court involve class actions
or even attorney fees. For example, the Court recently agreed to determine whether
expert witness fees can be included in awards of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 110 S.
Ct. 1294 (1990).
3 Evans v.JeffD., 475 U.S. 717, reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986).
4 Id.
5 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) (common funds case); Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (fee-shifting case).
6 Hensley, 461 U.S. 424.
7 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711
(1987) (Delaware Valley II). Because citizens' groups waged Delaware Valley II, it was not a
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Simply by posing these questions one assumes that attorneys
who win class actions are entitled to be paid. For example, in Blum
v. Stenson,8 the Supreme Court asked whether the size of the fund a
class recovers should affect the amount of money an attorney is
paid.9 The question need not be asked unless an attorney who rep-
resents a class successfully is entitled to compensation. If no entitle-
ment exists, no fee should be paid, and the amount recovered
should not affect the result.
There can be no rational system of regulating fee awards until
there is a coherent theory explaining why class action attorneys are
entitled to be paid. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to
put the cart before the horse. It continues to ask "How much?"
without first explaining "Why?" Although two possible answers to
the latter question have been suggested, neither enjoys the support
of the Court.
The first answer argues that attorneys are entitled to be paid
because class members are enriched at the attorneys' expense. This
restitutionary'O theory was first expressed in Central Railroad & Bank-
ing Co. v. Pettus.' In Pettus, the Court upheld a supplemental award
of fees to a group of attorneys who helped secure a common fund
for a creditor class. 12 After being paid by the named plaintiffs, the
attorneys applied for and received additional compensation from
the common fund. On appeal, several class members argued that
the attorneys had no right to payment from the common fund, but
the Justices disagreed. They reasoned that the fee paid by the
class action proper. I discuss it here because it creates law that applies to fee awards in
all cases, including class actions.
8 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
9 Id. at 900 n.16.
10 The word "restitutionary" appears in the RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrrUoN 5 (1937)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)] ("The earliest proceedings in common law courts
were restitutionary in nature."). However, no dictionary lists it. One scholar once
opined against the word, but, after encountering many instances of its use, changed his
mind. Compare BRYAN GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 480-81 (1987)
("restitutionary" not a recognized adjective) with Bryan Garner, The Missing Common-Law
Words, in THE STATE OF THE LANGUAGE 241 (Christoper Ricks & Leonard Michaels eds.
1990).
One can also question the propriety of using the word "restitutionary" to describe
claims seeking compensation to cure unjust enrichment. In some countries, persons
demand restitution only when they seek to recover items they once possessed. The
word has a broader meaning in the United States, encompassing both claims for return
of specific items and claims for compensation grounded in notions of unjust enrichment.
Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1277, 1279
(1989).
11 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
12 A common fund case brings a fund of money, to which a number of persons are
entitled, within the jurisdiction of a court. Typically, funds are created when defendants
make damage or settlement payments to a court.
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named plaintiffs failed to cover the reasonable value of the attor-
neys' time, that the class members profited at the attorneys' ex-
pense, and that the attorneys could therefore recover from the
common fund the difference between the reasonable value of their
services and the fee they had already received.15 Denying the attor-
neys a supplemental award would have left the class members un-
justly enriched at the attorneys' expense, in violation of the
equitable principle that persons who are unjustly enriched must
make restitution.
The second answer reasons that attorneys who run class actions
are entitled to be paid because fee awards encourage them to pro-
tect class members' rights. This theory, which is invoked mainly but
not exclusively in fee-shifting cases, 14 treats lawyers as economically
motivated actors who wage socially beneficial private attorney gen-
eral actions for selfish reasons. 15 Because the second answer fo-
cuses on incentives, I will refer to it as the economic theory of fee
awards.
Again, neither the restitutionary theory nor the economic the-
ory enjoys the unqualified support of the Supreme Court. The resti-
tutionary theory thrived for about ninety years after its
announcement in Pettus in 1885.16 During that period, lower court
judges applied the theory in increasingly novel ways, often aided
and encouraged by the Supreme Court. 17 In the mid-1970s, how-
ever, two events signalled the theory's demise. The first was the
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Wilderness Soci-
ety. 18 Alyeska neither overruled Pettus nor invalidated the notion that
fee awards are needed to cure unjust enrichment. Alyeska did draw a
bright line, however, by forbidding judges from taxing fees against
13 Pettus, 113 U.S. at 126-27.
14 In a fee-shifting case, a defendant can be made to pay attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred by a class. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (authorizing fee shifting
in favor of prevailing parties in civil rights cases).
15 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 ("the financial
incentive that class actions offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of the
increasing reliance on the 'private attorney general' for the vindication of legal rights"),
reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 947 (1980).
16 The doctrine found a passionate advocate in George D. Hornstein. See generally
George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956); George D. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative
Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1947); George D. Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockhold-
ers' Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 574 (1942); George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee
in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 39 COLuM. L. REV. 784 (1939).
17 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (interim fee award
from corporation upheld despite absence of tangible benefit to shareholders); Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (recognizing power to award fees for benefit
conferred via stare decisis effect of decision, in absence of common fund).
18 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
658 [Vol. 76:656
ATTORNEYS' FEES
defendants in the absence of statutory authorization.' 9 In so hold-
ing, Alyeska contrasted sharply with the Court's prior cases, which
generally supported lower court judges' efforts to expand their eq-
uitable powers to grant fee awards. 20 Alyeska put the world on notice
that the Court had reached the limit of its enthusiasm for the restitu-
tionary approach.
The second event that signalled the demise of the restitutionary
theory occurred when John P. Dawson, an outstanding scholar of
restitution, published three articles in the Harvard Law Review de-
bunking Pettus.21 Dawson argued that attorneys have no right to
compensation from common funds. 22 He agreed that attorneys are
entitled to fees from named plaintiffs, because named plaintiffs sign
contracts to which they can properly be held.23 But absent plaintiffs
sign no agreements. Consequently, Dawson concluded, absent
plaintiffs have no duty to pay attorneys, even when the attorneys'
efforts make them better off.24
Dawson's claim was simple, yet carried impressive force. His
articles persuaded almost everyone who read them.25 It seems fair
to say that because of Dawson few modem academic writers take the
restitutionary theory seriously.26 In that respect, academic writers
19 Id. at 268-71.
20 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (upholding an in-
terim fee award even though the plaintiffs had not secured any substantial relief). It is
difficult to justify Mills on unjust enrichment grounds. See John P. Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv. L. REV. 849, 866-70 (1975) (criti-
cism of Mills).
21 See Dawson, supra note 20; John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attor-
ney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974) [hereinafter Dawson, Fees from Funds];
John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1974) [hereinafter
Dawson, Intermeddler].
22 Dawson, supra note 20, at 852-53.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 851-54.
25 See, e.g., Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977); Michael D. Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty,
Efficien, and Fairness in the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207 (1984);
John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 476
(1981); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 65 n.1 (1985). But cf H.
NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 2.01, at 27-28 (perhaps the only criticism of Dawson's thesis: a
single paragraph within a 600-page book).
26 Scholars still write about attorneys' fees in class actions. Far too many articles
and notes have appeared to list here. See, e.g., Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evalu-
ating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. REV. 385 (1987); Note, A Public Goods
Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE LJ.
438, 439 (1989) (authored by William R. Mureiko). Judges continue to ponder fee
award problems as well. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
104-05 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter COMMrrTEE REPORT]; REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (1985) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
However, academic writers no longer discuss fee awards in class actions from a
restitutionary perspective. In other words, they no longer think fee awards are needed
1991] 659
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and judges are much alike. 27 Although judges still occasionally cite
Pettus and related cases, they do not seriously believe that justice is
on the side of plaintiffs' lawyers who seek fees. They are more likely
to regard plaintiffs' lawyers as bounty hunters whose ethics are dubi-
ous and without whom society would generally be better off, but
whose services are sometimes needed and who must therefore, how-
ever reluctantly, be paid.28
The Supreme Court confirmed the demise of the restitutionary
theory in 1986 when it decided Evans v. JeffD. 29 The question in Jeff
D. was whether a settlement could waive a class's right to a fee
award even though class counsel would thereby be denied a fee. Six
Justices answered affirmatively and the settlement was allowed to
to cure unjust enrichment. Instead, their concern is to design fee award practices that
align the interests of lawyers and plaintiffs in hope of encouraging lawyers to better
protect plaintiffs' interests and rights. The leading exponent of this view is John C.
Coffee, Jr. See John C. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
IND. LJ. 625 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking]; John C. Coffee, The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Under-
standing the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Cof-
fee, Plaintiff 's Attorney]; John C. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney Genera" Why the Model
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) [hereinafter
Coffee, Private Attorney General].
27 See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT 135 (Dec. 22, 1989) (placing the topic "Measurement of attorney fee
awards" under the more general heading "Incentives and Disincentives in Civil Litiga-
tion"); see also COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 26 (discussion of attorneys' fees appears in
the section entitled "Reducing Litigation's Complexity and Expediting Its Flow"; no
mention whatsoever of the need to cure unjust enrichment). The Study Committee con-
tained five federal judges and one state judge, in addition to other members.
Intuitions relating to unjust enrichment still occasionally influence judges. See, e.g.,
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (denying fees for services that do not benefit
plaintiffs); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (degree of success obtained in
a lawsuit may affect the size of the fee a lawyer is paid). Hensley kept alive a legal doctrine
rooted in cases that predate the demise of the unjust enrichment approach. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Build-
ers v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). But the
legal doctrine and the theory that spawned it have been detached. There is no explicit
discussion of unjust enrichment in Hensey or any other recent Supreme Court case tying
fee awards to benefits received.
Not all commentators are as impressed as I am by the change in the tenor ofjudges'
thinking. See, e.g., William Lynk, The Courts and the Market: An Economic Analysis of Contin-
gent Fees in Class-Action Litigation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 256 (1990) ("the language and
terminology adopted by most courts is more directly connected to concepts like justice
and fairness than economic efficiency"). Part IV of this Article reveals Lynk's mistake.
More and more often, judges use explicitly economic terms. See Bryant Garth, Ilene H.
Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney Genera" Perspectives from an Em-
pirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 361-66 (1988); Rowe, supra
note 2, at 622.
28 Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 27, at 360-66.
29 475 U.S. 717, reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986).
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stand, even though the fee waiver provision enabled the absent
plaintiffs to enrich themselves at their attorneys' expense. The re-
suit, and the failure of all the Justices, including the dissenters, to
mention the problem of unjust enrichment, strongly suggest that
the restitutionary theory is dead. 0
There is more life left in the economic theory, but it too was
dealt a heavy blow in Jeff D. The economic theory justifies fee
awards on the ground that they encourage lawyers to act as private
attorneys general on behalf of otherwise helpless victims. The con-
flict between the economic theory and the use of fee waiver agree-
ments is evident: fee waivers deter lawyers from acting as private
attorneys general by weakening the incentives fee awards create.
The conflict had little effect on the Justices who formed the majority
of theJeff D. Court, however. They perceived only a "remote" pos-
sibility that the fee waiver agreements would cause lawyers' willing-
ness to handle class actions to decline.3 ' To reach that conclusion,
the Court had to reject the central premise of the economic theory
of attorneys' fees: that lawyers respond to incentives.
The decision inJeffD. thus undermined the two major theories
of attorneys' fees in class actions, thereby leaving an entire area of
law theory-deprived. One can now explain the practice of compen-
sating lawyers who wage class actions only by saying that it has been
in place for more than one hundred years. That is too slim ajustifi-
cation for a practice that places millions of dollars in lawyers' pock-
ets year after year.32
Nor, if recent cases can be taken as a guide, is the Supreme
Court likely to produce a coherent account of attorneys' fees in class
actions anytime soon. Fee award cases tend to split the Court into
factions, none of which manage to win all the time. As a result, the
doctrine has evolved in inconsistent ways. For example, in Philadel-
phia v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley
II),33 the Supreme Court divided 4-4-1 over the permissibility of
30 See also Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic
Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939)).
31 JeffD., 475 U.S. at 741 n.34; see infra text accompanying notes 257-84 (Court's
reasoning inJeffD analyzed in greater detail).
32 Absent plaintiffs own the common funds that class actions produce. Boeing Co.
v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980). Fee-shifting statutes typically place the right to
recover fee awards in plaintiffs' hands. Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 730. Even so, fee awards
typically consume between 20% and 30% of absent plaintiffs' gains in common fund
cases, with several awards in the range of 50% on record. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 1,
§§ 2.08, 2.31-.32; Robert T. Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative
Suits, 3J. CoRP. L. 267 (1978). Fee awards in fee-shifting cases can also be impressively
large. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 703 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Haw. 1989) ($2,335,936
awarded in fees and interest).33 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
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contingency enhancements, with a plurality, joined by Justice
O'Connor, holding that fees can be enhanced in cases where plain-
tiffs have difficulty securing representation. After Delaware Valley II,
a lawyer who convinces a judge that no lawyer would have agreed to
represent a group of plaintiffs at a regular hourly rate can receive an
enhanced fee.34 This seems to reestablish the connection between
fees and willingness to wage private attorney general actions that
was severed in Jeff D. BecauseJeff D. undermines the theory Dela-
ware Valley II seems to embrace, it is difficult to reconcile cases in a
theoretical way.
Jeff D. and Delaware Valley 11 demonstrate that the law of attor-
neys' fees in class actions is falling into disarray. In hope of prevent-
ing further deterioration, this Article will attempt to breathe new life
into the discarded restitutionary approach. A sound restitutionary"
theory would help unify fee award law, which is now divided. One
body of law governs fee awards in common fund class actions; an-
other governs fee awards in class actions where fee shifting is al-
lowed. 35 However, from a restitutionary perspective, common fund
cases and fee-shifting cases are essentially alike. Both force one to
ask why it is right to give a lawyer money that could otherwise be
placed in plaintiffs' hands. The answer does not depend on the
route money travels. Whether a lawyer is paid from a fund a class
acquires by winning a claim for damages at trial or from a fund a
class acquires by enforcing its right to demand a fee award from a
defendant, the answer is the same. A lawyer is entitled to be paid
when and because class members are enriched at that lawyer's
expense.3 6
Because attorneys' claims for compensation have the same basis
in common fund and fee-shifting class actions, it follows that judges
should subject fee issues in all class actions to a single set of princi-
ples and rules. If a judge rightly awards an attorney one million
dollars in a common fund class action, then the judge should also be
34 Predictably, in the wake of Delaware Valley II, plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants
dispute the difficulty plaintiffs have securing representation. See, e.g., Rode v. Del-
larciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990); Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v.
AT&T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1988); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 493, 498 (D.N.J. 1988) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 888 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1989).
35 See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) (in common fund cases
"a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class," while in
fee-shifting cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 "a reasonable fee.., reflects the amount of
attorney time reasonably expended on the litigation").
36 To clarify, a fee-shifting case produces a grant of monetary or equitable merits-
based relief and a common fund large enough to yield a fee award. The absent plaintiffs
own the fee award fund, just as they own common funds in general. In both common
fund cases and fee-shifting cases, the question is therefore whether absent plaintiffs can
properly be required to share common funds they own with lawyers who wage class
actions.
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right to award one million dollars in an otherwise identical fee-shift-
ing case. The fees should be equal in the two cases because the
attorneys' claims would be the same.
The possibility of unifying the law of fee awards in class actions
is one strong reason for reconsidering the restitutionary approach.
Another reason is simply that the law of restitution is the right body
of law to apply. The practice of granting fee awards forces class
members to pay for services and benefits they neither request nor,
in many cases, are free to reject. In other words, it requires them to
participate in exchanges without their consent. Because the law of
restitution regulates forced exchanges of this kind, it is appropriate
to subject granting fee awards in class actions to the requirements of
that body of law. 37
I think the law of restitution, and the larger principles it embod-
ies, support the practice of paying attorneys who win class actions.
My aim in Parts I and II will be to prove this claim by arguing that
the practice of paying attorneys who win class actions satisfies resti-
tution's basic impulse to allocate benefits fairly without exceeding
limits the law rightly imposes on judges' power to award compensa-
tion.38 In Part III, I will refute Dawson's argument that attorneys
have no right to compensation on restitutionary grounds. Dawson's
critique rests on misconceptions about class action practice; he
probably would have endorsed the restitutionary theory had he
known more about class actions. Finally, in Part IV I apply the resti-
tutionary theory toJeffD. and Delaware Valley H. My aim in doing so
will be to show that the theory has bite. It enables judges to decide
practical issues in coherent and defensible ways.
I
THE DESIRE FOR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
It is difficult to explain why absent plaintiffs are obligated to pay
attorneys who represent plaintiff classes for the same reason it is
difficult to explain why it is proper to tax people in order to pay the
salaries of government officials. In both instances, people are
charged without their consent. They are forced to pay even though,
if asked, they might and probably would prefer to keep the money
for themselves.
People sometimes attempt to justify taxation by arguing that
forced exchanges of money and governmental services leave citizens
37 Levmore, supra note 25, at"67 ("Restitution occupies the crucial ground between
... tort and contract. Restitution deals with nonbargained benefits; tort law with
nonbargained harms; contract law with bargained benefits and harms.").
38 Richard J. Arneson's excellent article, The Pinciple of Fairness and Free-Rider
Problems, 92 ETmics 616 (1982), has greatly influenced the theory presented in Part I.
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better off. The underlying premise is that the benefits citizens re-
ceive are more valuable than the taxes they pay.39 Unfortunately,
this simple argument is inadequate to generate an obligation on the
part of absent class members to pay attorneys' fees as restitution.
The law of restitution disfavors forced exchanges, even exchanges
that leave the parties better off.40 Although the mandate to cure
unjust enrichment is clear,41 a basic principle of restitution is that a
person who receives a benefit voluntarily conferred in the absence
of mistake, coercion, request, or emergency is not unjustly enriched
and has no obligation to pay.42 The presumption is that recipient R
incurs a duty to pay provider P only when P bargains for compensa-
tion in advance and R agrees to pay.43 The presumption would sur-
vive a showing that a forced exchange of benefits for compensation
would leave R better off.
Absent plaintiffs do not hire attorneys; the truth is more nearly
the reverse.44 Attorneys acting for named plaintiffs draw absent
plaintiffs into class actions involuntarily and absent plaintiffs cannot
always extricate themselves once they are joined. Nor do absent
plaintiffs exert much control over the way class actions are run. In
many cases, they cannot even reject the benefits class actions pro-
vide. Absent plaintiffs are passive parties who "sit back and allow
the litigation to run its course." '45
Given the passivity of absent plaintiffs, the law of restitution
would presume that they have no obligation to pay for the benefits
class actions provide. A restitutionary theory of attorneys' fees in
class actions must overcome that presumption. It must show that
"accepting or even simply receiving the benefits of a [class action]
can.., obligate an individual to contribute" toward the expenses of
litigation, "even though the individual has not actually consented"
to pay in advance.46
This Part shows that, according to the law of restitution, it is
appropriate to require absent class members to pay attorneys' fees
39 See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
PROMINENT DOMAIN ch. 1 (1985).
40 See 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.1 (1978) (noting 'judicial
disapproval of unsolicited intervention . .. where the intervener expects compensa-
tion"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 2, at 34 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1983)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] ("no one should be empowered to thrust a benefit
on another and by that means become his creditor").
41 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 1.
42 Id. § 112.
43 Levmore, supra note 25, at 65; G. PALMER, supra note 40, § 10.1.
44 See sources cited infra note 94 (examples of client solicitation in class actions).
45 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
46 Arneson, supra note 38, at 623.
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when all of the following conditions are met:47
(1) It is impracticable for a group of absent plaintiffs to organize
a group lawsuit by voluntary means;
(2) As a result of successful class litigation, absent plaintiffs en-
joy benefits they would not otherwise receive;
(3) Absent plaintiffs do not receive the benefits as gifts;
(4) Absent plaintiffs either voluntarily accept the benefits they
receive or have no opportunity to decline them; and
(5) Absent plaintiffs are better off receiving benefits and paying
attorneys' fees than doing without the benefits entirely.
I contend that when these conditions are met, the law of restitution
requires absent plaintiffs to pay attorneys' fees. They have a duty to
compensate attorneys who litigate class actions for them because,
under the circumstances, it is just and practicable to require them to
pay.
The claim I am making is restitutionary in both the substantive
sense and the remedial sense.48 The presence of unjust enrichment
both generates the obligation to compensate class counsel and pro-
vides the measure of how much absent plaintiffs ought to pay.
When unjust enrichment is used substantively, "[t]he focus of
inquiry is on the meaning of [the word] 'unjust.' "49 Why would it
be unjust to decline to compensate an attorney whose efforts enrich
a class? The justness of a particular allocation of resources neces-
sarily depends on the conception ofjustice employed. The concep-
tion relevant to restitution is that of justice as reciprocity or fair
requital.50 This conception requires a person who benefits from an-
other's efforts or sacrifices-who reaps where another has sown-to
offer something of appropriate value in return.5' Because attorneys
help produce the gains absent plaintiffs enjoy, the conception ofjus-
47 Conditions (1) through (5) are adaptations of the conditions Arneson builds into
his principle of fairness. Id. at 621-22. Conditions (1) through (5) have analogs in the
law of restitution as well, as I show when discussing the conditions below. On reflection,
that is not surprising. Arneson aims to make plausible the existence of fairness-based
obligations to help pay for unsolicited, collectively provided benefits. The law of restitu-
tion is likewise concerned with assigning liability for benefits received in the absence of
contractual agreements, and an important purpose of the class action is to facilitate the
supply of benefits to groups.
48 See generally Laycock, supra note 10 (discussing substantive and remedial senses of
restitution).
49 Id at 1285.
50 I will not defend the conception of justice as reciprocity or fair requital, other
than by observing that the conception informs both the common understanding ofjus-
tice and the law of restitution. No more defense is needed. This Article merely applies
the law of restitution to a problem that properly falls within its ambit. I therefore take at
face value the moral impulse the law of restitution embraces.
51 This conception of justice has played a role in the thinking of many philoso-
phers. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 112 (1971); H.L.A. Hart, Are There
Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REv. 175 (1955).
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tice as reciprocity or fair requital obligates absent plaintiffs to offer
reasonable fees in return.52
It is hardly novel to observe that justice sometimes consists of
abstaining from consumption of the products of others and in pay-
ing compensation when one enjoys the fruits of others' labors with-
out their consent. The Bible tells us that it is "an hard man" who
reaps where another has sown.53 Locke opined that a person who
coveted land improved by another where ample land remained un-
appropriated "desired the benefit of another's Pains, which he had
no right to."'54 The point of Lockean property rules is to frustrate
such illegitimate desires and to "guarantee to individuals" the
"fruits of their own labour and abstinence."55
It is, then, a common moral notion that people are entitled to
keep for themselves the things they produce, except when they con-
fer rights of enjoyment on others in exchanges or as gifts. 56 An
equally common correlative notion is that a person who enjoys the
fruits of another's labor without acquiring a right of enjoyment
ought to pay compensation sufficient either to disgorge the gain or
to ensure the produce against loss. 57
The conception ofjustice as reciprocity informs the law of resti-
tution as well. Consider the common-law rule that a cotenant who
makes an improvement to a jointly held asset can recover the value
added by the improvement from the price the asset fetches when it
is sold. 58 According to Dawson, the rule reflects the belief that it
would be wrong to permit the "nonimprover ... to profit by the
improver's contribution." 59 The same sentiment initially led judges
to grant fee awards in class actions. The Supreme Court upheld a
supplemental payment of fees in Pettus because the absent plaintiffs
52 The conception ofjustice as reciprocity or fair requital is a distributive notion. It
focuses on the allocation of benefits rather than their total amount. As a distributive
notion, the conception of justice as fair requital contrasts with aggregative principles,
like the principle of wealth maximization, that focus on "the total amount of want-satis-
faction among the members of a reference group." BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT
43 (1965); see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 60ff (1981) (discussion of
wealth maximization).
53 "Lord, I knew thee that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown,
and gathering where thou hast not strawed." Matthew 25:24 (KingJames).
54 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 333 (Peter Laslett ed. 1963), quoted
in Arneson, supra note 38, at 627-28.
55 Arneson, supra note 38, at 628 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, Principles of Political
Economy, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS 208 (1965)).
56 Arneson calls this notion the Lockean "self-benefit principle." Id at 625-26.
57 There is room to disagree over the amount of compensation that ought to be
paid. Parts III and IV of this Article address the appropriate remedy in class actions.
58 JOHN P. DAWSON & GEORGE E. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 62 (2d ed. 1969);
Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 21, at 1422-27; Levmore, supra note 25, at 70.
59 Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 21, at 1424; see also id at 1424 n.39 (cases sup-
porting proposition).
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"accepted the fruits of their [attorneys'] labors." 60
One could cite other decisions awarding compensation on the
theory that people who enjoy the fruits of others' labor without first
acquiring an entitlement to do so should pay for the benefits they
receive. 6' But there is no need to multiply examples. The point I
want to make here is that the conception ofjustice as reciprocity has
long informed the law of restitution. It explains why people who
confer benefits on others can sometimes secure compensation, even
when recipients are themselves innocent of wrongdoing. 62 Obvi-
ously, the circumstances in which the law requires recipients to pay
must be, and are, much more sharply defined than the conception of
justice as fair requital standing alone would suggest. Mere receipt
of a benefit does not by itself generate a legal obligation to pay. 63
The purpose of the following Part is to identify certain requirements
that limit the obligation to make restitution and to show that, in
cl -...actionr,, those requirements generallv are met.
II
CONSTRAINTS ON THE PURsurr OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
To say that the law of restitution embodies a principle of dis-
tributive justice is not to say that the law strives for justice in all
contexts or at all costs. To the contrary, the law often withholds
compensation in cases where people reap what others have sown.
For example, when it is feasible for parties to bargain, restitution is
typically denied to providers who confer benefits without negotiat-
ing for payment in advance. 64 Courts also resist claims for compen-
sation when benefits are difficult to value and when there is a
significant risk that "a recipient may genuinely not want a benefit
.... even though its market value may be greater than the amount
of restitution sought by the provider."' 65 Restitution thus frowns on
providers who attempt to substitute courts for markets and on
claims that present a sizeable risk that a recipient will be forced into
60 Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 125 (1885).
61 See Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in
the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HAIv. L. REv. 595 (1942) (discussion of several cases); see
also RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES
§ 15 (4th ed. 1982) (same); Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 21 (same); Sam Ricketson,
"Reaping Without Sowing" Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-Austra-
lian Law, 7 U. NEw S. WALES LJ. 1 (1984) (special issue) (same).
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 40, comment b.
63 GRAHAM DOuTwArrE, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION 22 (1977); RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § I comment c.
64 DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 301-05 (1973); G. PALMER, supra note 40, § 10.1, at
360-61 ("Courts start with the premise that one should not be compensated for inter-
vening in the affairs of another without request").
65 Levmore, supra note 25, at 77.
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a disadvantageous exchange. In these contexts, courts sacrifice dis-
tributive justice for the sake of competing aims.66 Distributive jus-
tice is thus neither the only goal embodied in the law of restitution
nor, arguably, even the goal that body of law most consistently
serves. It is a goal to be pursued when alternative principles are
inactive or outweighed, so that the desire for distributive justice can
safely be put into play.
The cotenancy example highlights this interplay of goals. A co-
tenant who improves a jointly held asset cannot hold another co-
tenant personally liable for a share of the cost. An active cotenant
can, however, recover the value an improvement adds to a jointly
held good by invoking the right to partition. The remedy of parti-
tion typically requires that a jointly owned asset be sold and its pro-
ceeds divided in shares.
A policy of strict distributive justice would reject the ban on
personal liability and enable active cotenants to force passive coten-
ants to pay for unwanted improvements. For example, such a policy
would allow an active cotenant to install an expensive swimming
pool and charge a passive cotenant with a share of the cost. But a
passive cotenant who dislikes swimming or has a limited budget
might not want a pool. Moreover, the added property value attribu-
table to a pool might not cover the passive cotenant's loss.
The policy limiting active cotenants to the partition remedy
avoids this unfairness to passive cotenants. When a jointly owned
asset is sold and the value added by an improvement is deducted
from the sales price, the money remaining reflects the value the as-
set had before the improvement was made. Therefore, when that
amount is divided, the passive cotenant's share equals the value of
his or her portion of the unimproved asset. From an economic
point of view, the passive cotenant is no worse off than he or she
would have been if the improvement had not been made.67
Recognizing active cotenants' claims for compensation in the
context of proceedings for partition also permits judges to act effi-
ciently. The law of property permits cotenants to seek partition
whenever one of them wants to dissolve the joint ownership. When
a request for partition is filed, "a court must as a matter of course
ascertain the value of the property in question .... [E]valuating the
improvement [made by one cotenant] will probably require little ad-
66 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, §§ 40-42, 112.
67 For example, suppose the property was worth $25,000 with the pool and
$20,000 before the pool was added. On partition, the sale of the property would bring
in $25,000, $5000 of which would go to the active cotenant as the value added. The
remaining $20,000 would equal the value the property had without the pool, and the
passive cotenant's share of that amount would have the same economic value as his
share of the unimproved asset.
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ditional work .... Once valuation is under way the law can afford to
recognize the provider of nonbargained benefits."'68 The adminis-
trative cost of dividing benefits fairly, given that benefits must be
divided, is acceptably low. The cotenancy example shows that the
law of restitution allows courts to act on the desire for distributive
justice in contexts where a decision to grant compensation would
not disserve other important goals. Insofar as the law of restitution
is concerned, the courts' power to require absent class members to
pay class counsel is and ought to be similarly constrained. A policy
that seeks to do distributive justice in class actions is defensible on
restitutionary grounds only if the policy respects the diverse goals
the law of restitution traditionally seeks to serve. It is for that rea-
son that the five conditions set out above must be met.69 Each con-
dition addresses a concern which would force one to question the
propriety of a court's decision to require absent plaintiffs to pay at-
torneys' fees in a class action. A restitutionary theory must embrace
the long-standing desire to allocate benefits fairly, but it must also
explain and accommodate competing considerations that have tradi-
tionally limited judges' power to grant compensation.
A. Absent Plaintiffs Cannot Practicably Organize Voluntary
Litigation Groups
The law of restitution often requires judges to deny claims for
compensation filed by providers who fail to bargain with recipients
for payment in advance. When provider P and recipient R can bar-
gain over the terms of compensation before a good or service is sup-
plied, R incurs no obligation to pay if P acts in the absence of an
agreement.70 A provider's failure to bargain in a context where a
recipient could have consented tends to show that the recipient
would have refused to pay if asked.
The effect of withholding compensation in contexts where par-
ties can bargain is to demonstrate a preference for voluntary ex-
change. However, when impediments that have nothing to do with
the desirability of an exchange make it difficult for parties to bar-
gain, the law of restitution sometimes authorizes judges to grant
compensation to providers who act without securing recipients'
prior consent. In these cases, a denial of compensation would
merely leave an unjust allocation of benefits intact. It would not
encourage providers to bargain with recipients in markets because,
by assumption, bargaining cannot occur.
68 Levmore, supra note 25, at 70.
69 See supra text accompanying note 47.
70 D. DOBBS, supra note 64, at 301-02; RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 112
comment a, illustrations 1-3 (absent agreement, construe transfer as gift).
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Consider the classic case, admittedly extreme, in which a doctor
cares for an unconscious patient. Because the doctor and the pa-
tient cannot bargain, the failure to bargain is not disqualifying. The
law of restitution permits doctors to recover,7 1 but in keeping with
the preference for negotiated exchanges, the limit of a doctor's
claim to restitution is reached when a patient's ability to communi-
cate is restored. 72 The law encourages doctors to bargain with pa-
tients who are compos mentis, but allows doctors to treat patients who
need care and are incapable of consenting, and to charge them with-
out securing their agreement. The arrangement encourages doc-
tors to price their services in markets when feasible, but does not
flinch from forcing exchanges in contexts where parties cannot
bargain.
The law also allows providers to claim compensation in cases
that are more mundane. A landlord who protects property left be-
hind by a tenant is entitled to compensation for storage expenses if
the tenant reclaims the property, as long as the landlord was unable
to contact the tenant at the time a decision to store the goods had to
be made.73 Likewise, a person who attends to a stranger's remains
can recover funeral expenses if a need arises to care for a body
before an appropriate relative of a decedent can be located and
advised.74
In none of the cases just mentioned would it be strictly correct
to say that bargaining is impossible. A doctor might secure an un-
conscious patient's consent by waiting for the patient to revive or by
finding a relative or an agent authorized to act on the patient's be-
half. A landlord could wait for a tenant to return or expend the time
and effort needed to track down a tenant. A corpse could remain
unburied until a decedent's relatives were found. In each case, the
problem is not the literal impossibility of bargaining, but the inabil-
ity to tolerate delay. Emergency medical care must be given imme-
diately. Goods left exposed have to be stored quickly because they
may otherwise be stolen or destroyed. A corpse requires prompt
attention because a decaying body is an affront to common morality
and a threat to public health.
In some cases, the problem is more nearly undue expense than
delay. The cost of contacting a former tenant who left to visit a for-
eign land may exceed the value of the goods the tenant left behind.
71 Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); In re Crisan Estate, 362
Mich. 569, 107 N.W.2d 907 (1961); RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 116.
72 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, §§ 114, 116.
73 2 G. PALMER, supra note 40, § 10.3; RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 117
comment b, illustration 1.
74 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 115 comment b.
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Or the cost may simply be greater than a landlord is willing to bear.
But if the goods are worth protecting because their value exceeds
the cost of storing them safely until the tenant returns, they ought to
be stored instead of being disposed of or allowed to waste because
the tenant will gain even after storage charges are paid. By requir-
ing a tenant who reclaims stored property to pay the freight, the law
reallocates benefits in a fair way and recognizes the importance of
bargaining expense.
It is helpful to think about expense when considering the possi-
bility that absent plaintiffs might form voluntary litigation groups.
In Smith v. Swormstedt,75 an 1853 Supreme Court case, the defendant
pressed for dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to join
all interested persons as parties. Justice Nelson, writing for the
Court, met the defendant's contention by noting that "[w]here the
parties.., are numerous, their rights and liabilities are so subject to
change and fluctuation by death or otherwise, that it would not be
possible, without very great inconvenience, to make all of them par-
ties, and would oftentimes prevent the prosecution of the suit to a
hearing."' 76 To prevent "a failure of justice," the Court held that
some victims could sue on behalf of all. 77 To talk of the "inconven-
ience" of joining parties voluntarily is to talk of expense.
Similarly, in Pettus, the first case in which lawyers were paid di-
rectly from a common fund, the Court observed that "[c]o-opera-
tion among" the members of the class "was impracticable" because
the plaintiffs resided in many states. 78 The Justices also noted that
"[ilf some [plaintiffs] did not move, the interests of all would have
suffered," apparently because the assets would have been placed be-
yond the class members' reach.79 Again, the judgment rested at
least partly on undue expense. It may have been possible in princi-
ple to join the absent plaintiffs voluntarily, but the named plaintiffs
could not do so in the time allowed at an acceptable cost. A rule
requiring voluntary joinder would have served only to make the ab-
sent plaintiffs worse off.
In a more recent case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,80 the Court
concluded that a class action was the only feasible means of pro-
ceeding for "most of the plaintiffs" because of the small size of their
claims. 81 The implication is twofold. First, the plaintiffs would have
found it uneconomical to sue individually. Second, they would also
75 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
76 Id. at 303.
77 Id
78 Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 123 (1885).
79 Id
80 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
81 Id at 809. The claims averaged about $100 per plaintiff. Id
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have found it impracticable to coordinate a group lawsuit by volun-
tary means. The cost of locating all the plaintiffs, contracting with
them, and bringing a group lawsuit together rendered a voluntary
group suit unprofitable.8 2
Free-riding may also hinder the formation of voluntary litiga-
tion groups. When groups of plaintiffs sue to produce nonexclusive
goods83 like school desegregation, legislative reapportionment, or
prison reform, benefits necessarily flow to all victims, not merely to
those who actually participate in group suits. Consequently, many
victims lack incentives to join litigation groups. Why help pay for a
lawsuit when one can enjoy the benefits of litigation without the
expense?8 4
The obstacles to organizing group lawsuits are thus severe, and
they are similar in kind to the obstacles that impede collective ac-
tions of other sorts. However, voluntary collective actions often oc-
cur despite the existence of impediments. It therefore seems
reasonable to expect many litigation groups to form spontaneously
as well, and they do. Plaintiffs actually wage voluntary group law-
suits far more often than class actions, and the number of plaintiffs
represented in such suits can be surprisingly large.8 5
In most voluntary group suits pre-existing organizations are
plaintiffs.86 For example, in International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brock,87 the United Au-
tomobile Workers challenged certain eligibility restrictions that pre-
vented some of its members from receiving federal aid. The
Secretary of Labor argued that the union lacked standing to sue on
its members' behalf and that the members had to proceed as a class,
which they failed to do.88 A majority of the Justices rejected that
contention, extolled the virtues of suits brought by voluntary mem-
bership organizations, and allowed the union to proceed.8 9
Union-led suits are only the tip of the iceberg. Far more nu-
82 In some cases the difficulty of joining plaintiffs voluntarily arises because their
identities are unknown. See, e.g., Holland v. Steele, 92 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1981). In so-
called "future class actions" it can be impossible in principle to identify absent plaintiffs
because their relationship to the defendant or their injury has not arisen yet. Robert F.
Schuwerk, Future Class Actions, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 63 (1987).
83 I describe nonexclusive goods in greater detail below. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 138-39.
84 Free-riding is a standard obstacle to the voluntary organization and maintenance
of collective endeavors. See generally RusSELL HtRDIN, COLLECTIVE AC-ION 114-15
(1982).
85 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 ILL. L. REv. 43,
63-64.
86 Id. at 62-63.
87 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
88 Id. at 288.
89 Id at 281-90.
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merous are suits by corporations, partnerships, pension funds, so-
cial clubs, homeowners' associations, political interest groups, and
other organizations. The number of organizations that sue on be-
half of their members is astonishingly large.90
Even so, the scope of organizational activity is limited if only
because in many situations where group lawsuits might be feasible
no suitable pre-existing organization can be found. No group may
have enough members who are adversely affected by an actual or
threatened unlawful act to move the organization to sue. Or an or-
ganization may be willing to sue but may be able to protect only its
members' interests, so that an organizational lawsuit would leave
many victims without relief. Organizations can and do underwrite
class actions in contexts like these,9 1 but they might not do so if they
were denied the power to spread costs among the nonmembers they
serve. The power to force nonmembers to share costs reduces the
burden an organization must bear and gives an organization a rea-
son to include nonmembers in a group suit.92
Entrepreneurial lawyers pick up some cases organizations
miss.93 These lawyers are experienced in the arts of client recruit-
ment and litigation finance, and they can make a go of group law-
suits in some contexts where organizations and individual plaintiffs
cannot. 94 But lawyers confront obstacles as well. Four that could
easily be removed are rules of professional ethics that restrict attor-
neys' ability to solicit clients,95 to underwrite litigation,96 to pay for
referrals, 97 and to split fees.98 Although the magnitude of the ef-
90 For other kinds of cases, see Yeazell, supra note 85, at 60-63; Note, From Net to
Sword- Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Members' Claim, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663
(authored by Dale Gronmeit).
91 Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1075-88 (1970).
92 See infra text accompanying notes 109-25 (discussion of the possibility of using
suits brought on behalf of some victims in place of class actions).
93 See generally Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26 (role of lawyers in initi-
ating class actions). See also R. HARDIN, supra note 84, at 35-37 (role of entrepreneurs in
organizing collective actions).
94 Mass solicitation of clients occurred in the famous Agent Orange litigation, in
the wake of the Bhopal disaster, and in many other cases. PETER SCHUCK, AGENT OR-
ANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 51-52 (1987); Coffee, En-
trepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 885-86; Coffee, Rethinking, supra note 26, at 632;
Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36J. LEGAL EDuc. 317, 319 (1986); David T. Austern, Is
Lawyer Solicitation of Bhopal Clients Ethical?, Legal Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at 16.
95 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983); see also Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (upholding power of state bar associations to disci-
pline members who solicit clients), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
96 In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485 (D. Md. 1982) (denying
class certification on ground that attorneys improperly advanced costs of litigation for
named plaintiffs). The Kutak Commission recommended that attorneys be permitted to
advance expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of litiga-
tion. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1983).
97 McNeary v. American Cyanamid Co., 105 Wash. 2d 136, 712 P.2d 845 (1986).
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fects these restrictions have on lawyers' ability to organize litigation
groups is unclear, 99 they certainly make the task more difficult than
it would otherwise be.100
Even when a suit clears these hurdles, other problems remain.
Lawyers often find it unprofitable to organize group lawsuits when
victims' claims are small, because of the prohibitive cost of identify-
ing, locating, and contacting victims. Moreover, attorneys cannot
contract with potential group members who have yet to be victim-
ized, although such individuals may be numerous and their presence
may be needed to maintain a viable lawsuit.' 0 ' Finally, entre-
preneurial lawyers cannot overcome free-rider problems in cases
where the benefits of litigation automatically flow to all victims, in-
cluding those who decline to pay.102
The most basic obstacle, however, is expense. It is costly to
contract with large numbers of plaintiffs individually and, after con-
tracting, to finance complex, large-scale lawsuits. Lawyers are un-
derstandably reluctant to shoulder these burdens. They know that
reimbursement will come, if it comes, many years down the road
and they find it economically unwise to extend themselves. Why in-
cur the costs and risks that attend group litigation when one can do
a brisk business in conventional lawsuits instead?
Although the prospects for organizing litigation groups volun-
tarily are thus often poor, in the end they turn on facts that vary
from case to case. Consequently, whenever a class action is pro-
posed, the possibility exists that a group lawsuit could be organized
by voluntary means. Judges are supposed to consider that possibil-
98 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(1) (1981); MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e)(2) (1983).
99 Coffee has suggested that lawyers who wage class actions often ignore these re-
strictions. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 896-99.
100 For a general discussion of obstacles to solicitation in class action litigation, see
HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15.04 (1985). Rhode points out that
lawyers who solicit clients en masse have been censured by the bar. Rhode, supra note 94,
at 322-23 (California trial lawyers voted to censure attorneys who solicited clients in the
wake of the disaster in Bhopal, India; the American Council of Trial Lawyers passed a
similar resolution concerning soliciting in general); Brian J. Waid, Ethical Problems of the
Class Action Practitioner. Continued Neglect by the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 27 LOYOLA L. REV. 1047 (1981).
101 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (mootness avoided by defining class in an
open-ended way, thereby continually adding new plaintiffs who remained subject to the
one-year residency requirement at issue in the case).
102 Free-riding is also a significant problem in cases where damages are sought,
though in such cases free-riding attorneys rather than their clients are to blame. An
attorney who represents an individual client in a "tag-along" action, a lawsuit consoli-
dated with but separate from a class action, earns more at the margin than a lawyer
whose client litigates as part of a class. Consequently, lawyers often encourage their
clients to opt out of class actions in the hope of protecting their fees. Coffee, En-
trepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 907-15.
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ity before permitting class actions to proceed. The federal and state
rules that govern class actions authorize involuntary joinder only
when it is impracticable to include all class members by other
means.' 03 Although this requirement is ambiguous and has been
interpreted in a variety of ways,' 04 clearly relevant factors include
the absolute number of plaintiffs, their geographic locations, the
ease with which they can be identified and contacted, and the sizes
of their claims.' 0 5 Certification of a class justifies an inference that a
voluntary group lawsuit on behalf of all victims could not proceed.
The modem class action is thus a vehicle for an otherwise im-
practicable group proceeding. Its purpose, in part, is to enable vic-
tims to enjoy benefits of group litigation that lie beyond their
reach.'0 6 The class action makes group litigation possible by elimi-
nating the need to secure victims' consent. A lawyer who wishes to
initiate a class suit can do so by signing a single client and filing a
class action complaint. In effect, a lawyer can enlist an unlimited
number of absent plaintiffs with the stroke of a pen.
The prospects for bargaining with absent plaintiffs may and
often do improve once a class action is underway. For example, in
class actions brought primarily to secure monetary relief, it may be-
come practicable to send form contracts to absent plaintiffs after a
favorable ruling on liability is won.' 0 7 This appears to have been
103 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(1); THoMAs A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACIONS: THE LAW OF 50
STATES § 6.03 (1988) ("Every state class action rule requires some demonstration that
the class is so numerous thatjoinder is impractical.").
104 H. NEWBERG, supra note 100, §§ 3.03-.06.
1O5 See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (practicability depends on class
size and ease of locating and identifying class members); Swanson v. American Con-
sumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969) (geographic dispersion coupled with claims
too small to support individual suits); Dale Elecs. Inc. v. RCL Elecs. Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531
(D.N.H. 1971) (geographic dispersion of class members renders voluntary joinder
impossible).
106 Class actions can also be used to conserve public adjudicatory resources, to re-
duce the risk of inconsistent verdicts and obligations, and to achieve distributive fairness
among victims in cases where defendants possess limited funds. See generally H. NEW-
BERG, supra note 100, chs. 1-2 (discussing purposes served by class actions).
107 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2). Notice could easily include a paragraph explaining that
absent plaintiffs who fail to opt out are liable for attorneys' fees. Such language is often
included in notices, even though it is not required by Rule 23. See In re Antibiotic Anti-
trust Actions, No. 71 Civ. 570, at 3 (S.D.N.Y.June 1, 1971 (unreported order)), noted in
H. NEWBERG, supra note 100, § 8.31.
Notices are not contracts, however. The Book-of-the-Month Club can infer agree-
ment to pay when a member fails to reply, but a lawyer waging a class action cannot. A
person who receives notice of a class action may not even read it, much less understand
it. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class
Actions after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 22 n.162 (1986); Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STN. L. REv. 1183, 1234-35 (1982);John Home
& Chip King, IAm Sony, But I Cannot Attend Your Class Action, Va. L. Weekly, Feb. 4, 1972.
It would therefore be inappropriate to base contractual obligations and personal liability
on an absent plaintiff's failure to reply. Even so, much is gained by mentioning fees in
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done with considerable success in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co.,108 where fewer than ten percent of the absent
plaintiffs failed to sign representation agreements before fees were
paid. This relieved the district court of the bulk of the responsibility
for awarding and apportioning fees. When it becomes practicable
to regulate fees contractually during the pendency of a class action
suit, a restitutionary theory of fee awards encourages the use of pri-
vate fee agreements.
In the class action context, it is difficult for attorneys and clients
to bargain face-to-face. Consequently, the law of restitution neither
does nor should automatically bar attorneys who wage class actions
successfully from seeking compensation. When bargaining impedi-
ments are severe, a lawyer who fails to bargain for compensation
before providing a service to a class has a claim to be paid. With-
holding compensation would not encourage the use of markets; it
would merely deny compensation to a lawyer who provided valuable
services for others and leave an unjust allocation of benefits intact.
B. Involuntary Group Litigation Provides Absent Plaintiffs
Benefits They Would Not Otherwise Receive
There can be no unjust enrichment unless there is enrichment
first. 10 9 The law of restitution generates no obligations to support
lost causes. It requires people to pay compensation only when ben-
efits actually are received. Equally, the restitutionary theory of at-
torneys' fees obligates class members to bear litigation expenses
only when class actions secure relief. In that respect, the theory is in
accord with existing law which conditions the payment of fees on
success in litigation.110 The contingent fee nature of class action
practice flows naturally from the restitutionary approach.
Even when a class prevails and absent plaintiffs receive benefits,
notices. Absent plaintiffs who read and understand notices are warned that fees will be
withheld from their shares of common funds if they remain in a class and file claims.
They are thereby enabled to make informed decisions whether to exclude themselves
from class actions.
108 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The opinion does not explain how the ethical
rule barring client solicitation was avoided.
109 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 1 comments a, b. I assume that a lawyer
does not benefit a class merely by providing services, as a doctor might be said to benefit
a patient by increasing the patient's chance of recovering even if the patient ultimately
dies. Id § 155 comment d. The treatment accorded doctors is exceptional. Persons
who provide unsolicited services are ordinarily denied compensation unless tangible
benefits are received.
110 H. NEWBERG, supra note 100, § 14.02. The policy that attorneys can be denied
compensation for hours spent on unsuccessful claims, announced in Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), also comports with the restitutionary theory. Because time
spent on unsuccessful claims that are unrelated to a winning claim confer no benefits on
absent plaintiffs, absent plaintiffs have no duty to pay for that time.
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one could object to the payment of attorneys' fees if absent plaintiffs
would have enjoyed the same benefits without a class action being
brought. The fact that a group of plaintiffs would find it impractica-
ble to organize a joint lawsuit voluntarily does not establish that an
involuntary proceeding is the only way to protect all victims' inter-
ests and rights. A lawsuit waged by a single plaintiff or by a few
plaintiffs suing jointly might protect all victims at once."I And if a
single plaintiff or a small group of plaintiffs would find it profitable
to sue alone, one might reasonably ask why all victims should be
required to share the cost of an involuntary group suit. When the
self-interest of a single person or of a few is adequate to support the
provision of a good for an entire group, there is no need to
strengthen incentives by spreading costs. 1" 2 It may therefore be ap-
propriate to claim that no fee should be awarded unless the absent
plaintiffs would not have received the benefit butfor the success of
the class suit.
The possibility that individuals may find it economically rational
to provide goods for groups is well known to scholars of collective
action." 13 In seeking to benefit themselves, people acting alone and
in small groups often serve others as well. By mowing yards, paint-
ing homes, staying free of communicable diseases, reporting crimes,
driving safely, and doing thousands of other things for primarily
111 For example, a lawsuit brought to reapportion a state legislature or modify a
system of electingjudges may protect all persons whose rights are violated by the unlaw-
fil voting scheme.
112 Arneson agrees that no obligation to support a collective action arises when a
single person or a small coalition of individuals finds it advantageous to supply a benefit
for a group in the absence of contributions from others. See Arneson, supra note 38, at
622. By contrast, my colleague Calvin Johnson would allow judges to require absent
plaintiffs to contribute even when named plaintiffs might sue alone, on the ground that
the quantity and quality of litigation would otherwise be suboptimal. Johnson points
out, correctly, in my view, that named plaintiffs rarely if ever find it economically rational
to spend as much money on lawsuits as groups of plaintiffs would if they could act in
their collective interest. Consequently, named plaintiffs sometimes fail to act when a
joint lawsuit would be economically beneficial for a group, and when they do sue, they
invest fewer resources than a group would find it economical to spend. Letter from
Calvin Johnson to Charles Silver (Sept. 24, 1990).
113 R. HARnIN, supra note 84, at 42. Russell Hardin recounts
the actual case of billionaire Howard Hughes, whose tastes ran to watch-
ing westerns and aviation movies on television from midnight to 6:00
a.m. When he moved to Las Vegas where the local television station went
off the air at 11:00 p.m., his aides badgered the station's owner to sched-
ule movies through the night until the owner finally challenged a Hughes
emissary: "Why doesn't he just buy the thing and run it the way he wants
to?" Hughes obliged, paid $3.8 million for the station, and ran movies
until 6:00 a.m. The potential audience for these movies was a quarter of
a million people.
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selfish reasons, people confer benefits on society at large. Self-seek-
ing actions taken by individuals often have positive external effects.
In most instances where persons acting self-interestedly pro-
vide goods for entire groups, the law does not require beneficiaries
to pay. I cannot require my neighbors to share the cost of painting
my house or beautifying my yard, even though they benefit from my
investments of money and time. The law of restitution denies me
the option of spreading costs, in part because I can be expected to
maintain the appearance of my property without my neighbors'
help.114
Because victims sometimes sue alone in contexts where class
actions can be brought,"15 and because lawsuits brought by indi-
viduals sometimes yield class-wide relief, it may not always be
appropriate to require absent plaintiffs to share the expense of
group litigation. When a conventional suit can protect the rights of
an entire class and individual plaintiffs have adequate incentives to
sue, a truly restitutionary theory might free class members from the
burden of sharing costs. It might allow them to enjoy the benefits of
group litigation for free, because even without group litigation the
same benefits would be received.
An economist would be inclined to criticize the policy just de-
scribed on the ground that it encourages a suboptimal supply of
benefits. Even when self-interest moves people to act in ways that
benefit others, they may not be motivated to supply benefits in the
quantities or qualities others want. For example, I would maintain
the grounds surrounding my home in better condition than I now
do if I could require my neighbors to share my costs, and they might
be happier with the improvements, even after contributing, than
they are now. A policy requiring beneficiaries to share producers'
costs may make both producers and beneficiaries better offi
A philosopher might criticize the policy on fairness grounds. If
justice requires people to pay compensation when they enjoy the
fruits of others' labors without others' consent, then a policy that
allows beneficiaries to profit from the self-interested conduct of
others without charge is unjust.
The law's reluctance to grant restitution to self-seeking people
whose actions benefit others as well as themselves probably reflects
practical considerations rather than any inherent dislike of fairness
or economic efficiency. A policy allowing me to recover part of the
cost of maintaining my yard from my neighbors, and allowing them
to recover a portion of their costs from me, would engender signifi-
114 See generally Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 21 (discussing sufficiency of self-
interest).
115 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 904-30.
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cant administrative costs and would require judges to address formi-
dable problems of valuation. It may be better to tolerate a degree of
suboptimality in the production of benefits and a degree of unfair-
ness than to ask judges to rectify the situation.
Practical considerations, including valuation problems, that
might weigh against the payment of attorneys' fees in class actions
are addressed in later sections. The point to be made here is that
class actions often yield desirable third-party effects that conven-
tional lawsuits tend not to produce. In contexts where class actions
are waged, it is usually not the case that absent plaintiffs would gain
even if only conventional lawsuits were waged.
Consider Pettus, where the named plaintiffs held about one-
sixth of the bonds owned by the class. Their stake was sufficient to
move them to contact attorneys and, we can assume for the mo-
ment, it may even have been large enough to move them to sue
alone or in the company of a few other bondholders with large
claims.' 16 However, if the named plaintiffs had sued alone or with a
few other plaintiffs, they would have had no incentive to seek class-
wide relief. Their interest would have been to protect themselves
and any other bondholders who helped pay for the suit. In fact, the
named plaintiffs in Pettus did seek to limit the scope of the lawsuit to
include only bondholders "who should come in and contribute to
the expenses of the litigation."' "17 They were content to represent
only bondholders who agreed to pay. Because few bondholders re-
fused to join after the case was won, as a practical matter the lawsuit
benefitted the entire class. But the named plaintiffs were not forced
to seek a class-wide grant of relief. They did so apparently only be-
cause they hoped to spread the cost of maintaining the suit.
Conventional damages actions, actions for money brought by
individuals, are thus poor substitutes for class actions because they
have limited third-party effects. All my neighbors benefit automati-
cally when I beautify my property, but successful lawsuits for dam-
ages do not put cash in bystanders' hands. They may create
precedents and res judicata effects that bystanders can use in subse-
quent suits, 1 1 8 but the immediate benefits of litigation flow to only
plaintiffs who actually sue.' x9
By contrast, individual lawsuits seeking broad-based injunctive
reforms or declaratory judgments sometimes substitute well for
116 The facts do not support this assumption.
117 Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 127 (1885).
118 %Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEx. L. REv. 63
(1988).
119 In other words, a person who maintains a house produces a nonexclusive good,
whereas a person who sues for damages produces an exclusive good. See infra text ac-
companying notes 137-39.
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class actions. For example, a lawsuit brought by a single plaintiff
could prevent a state from denying unemployment benefits to an
entire class of persons. 120 Similarly, a suit maintained by a single
plaintiff to enforce relevant laws could protect everyone interested
in environmental preservation. 121
Alas, the fit between conventional injunctive and declaratory
cases and class actions is imperfect. Judges have only limited au-
thority to grant class-wide relief at the behest of individual plaintiffs,
and they are sometimes reluctant to exercise the powers they pos-
sess. 122 As a general matter, the law appears to permit judges to
grant injunctions just wide enough to relieve the plight of those
plaintiffs who actually participate in a case. 123
An additional difficulty that makes individual lawsuits poor sub-
stitutes for class actions is that victims often lack incentives to sue in
contexts where injunctive and declaratory actions can be brought.
For example, victims of civil rights violations can rarely afford to
hire attorneys. Moreover, when victims are entitled to only or pri-
marily nonmonetary relief, traditional contingent fee arrangements
cannot successfully be employed. Partly to remedy this deficiency,
Congress enacted fee-shifting statutes that enable plaintiffs in civil
rights cases to hold losing defendants liable for expenses and
fees.' 24 Without such statutes victims would often fail to sue.
Because fee-shifting statutes sometimes make it economically
feasible for individuals to wage conventional lawsuits seeking broad-
based relief, it may seem difficult to justify an attorney's right to
compensation when an injunctive or declaratory fee-shifting class
action is waged instead of a conventional suit. When a conventional
lawsuit is both feasible and, for all practical purposes, as good as a
class action, an obligation on the part of absent plaintiffs to pay at-
torneys' fees cannot be justified on restitutionary grounds even if a
class action is certified by a judge. Under the circumstances, it
120 See Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974).
121 See Yeazell, supra note 85, at 62 (observing that organizations often sponsor indi-
vidual actions that seek broad-based relief in an effort to protect the interests of a class
of beneficiaries).
122 See Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978) (for judge to grant class-wide
injunctive relief, class must be indistinguishable from individual plaintiff in all respects);
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 229 (1985) (citing Hurley).
123 Zepeda v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719 (9th
Cir. 1985).
124 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908; H.R. RE'. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976). For lists of
federal statutes with fee-shifting provisions, see JEFFREY R. GOODSTEIN, ArrORNEY'S
FEES: WINNING A RECOVERY IN FEDERAL COURT (1985); H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, ch.
28.
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would be wrong to say that absent plaintiffs would not have benefit-
ted but for the class suit.
On inspection, the problem turns out not to be fatal to the pro-
ject at hand. In the circumstances described, there is no need to
base an attorney's right to payment on restitutionary grounds. One
can rely on the contract between an attorney and a named plaintiff
instead. The contract suffices because, in a fee-shifting case, a
named plaintiff is entitled to recover all reasonable litigation ex-
penses, including the cost of suing on behalf of a class, even when
expenses greatly exceed the size of a named plaintiff's stake in a
case. 125 In cases where fee-shifting statutes enable plaintiffs to wage
conventional lawsuits that can supplant class actions, the need to
extract fees from absent plaintiffs disappears even if a class action is
waged. The restitutionary theory fails, but there is no loss because
there is no call for its application.
In sum, in all but a few cases, lawsuits waged by individuals are
poor substitutes for class actions. Moreover, when the fit is good,
individuals often lack incentives to sue. Fee-shifting statutes help
matters by enabling solitary plaintiffs to wage some broad-based
suits. But these statutes also eliminate the need to tax absent plain-
tiffs because they enable named plaintiffs to finance class suits alone.
Speaking realistically, absent plaintiffs pay attorneys' fees only when
conventional lawsuits cannot replace class actions, because only
then do they actually contribute something to a group suit. The
practice of taxing them then is defensible on restitutionary grounds
because class actions are the only means of providing absent plain-
tiffs with relief.
C. Absent Plaintiffs Do Not Receive Benefits As Gifts
A person who enjoys a benefit can usually escape paying for it
by showing that the benefit came as a gift. A donee has no obliga-
tion to compensate a donor because a donee is not unjustly en-
riched. 126 For example, a tenant has no obligation to compensate a
landlord who, when storing the tenant's goods, had no intent to
charge. 127 Nor, in general, are volunteers entitled to compensation
for services they provide. 128 Similarly, a lawyer who acts with dona-
tive intent when serving a class has no right to compensation. Ab-
sent plaintiffs are not obligated to pay for services offered as gifts.
125 See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (upholding fee award of
$245,456.25 in civil rights case against police force brought by eight plaintiffs who re-
covered only $33,350 in damages).
126 D. DOBBS, supra note 64, § 4.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 40, § 2 com-
ment c.
127 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 117 comment b.
128 D. DOBBS, supra note 64, § 4.9.
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With some justification, one could contend that lawyers who
wage class actions often lack the intent to charge. 129 Judges do not
conscript attorneys to serve as class counsel. Attorneys volunteer
for thejob. Sometimes they even compete with other attorneys who
also want to be appointed. Because attorneys nominate themselves,
it may be fitting to say that they act with donative intent or that they
cannot reasonably expect to be paid.
The argument is most persuasive when class actions are run by
legal aid attorneys. Consider Evans v. Jeff D. 13 0 The lawyers who
handledJeffD. were salaried employees of Idaho Legal Aid Services,
Inc. (ILAS). ILAS is a publicly supported legal aid agency whose
mission is to serve clients who are too poor to purchase legal care.
In keeping with its mission, ILAS did not require the named plain-
tiffs in Jeff D. to pay fees. Nor did ILAS write a clause into its re-
tainer agreements barring the named plaintiffs from waiving the
defendants' liability for fees. In addition, when the defendants pro-
posed a partial settlement, ILAS did not object to a provision in the
agreement that freed the settling defendants from the obligation of
paying its fees. Only when the final settlement was proposed did
ILAS protest. Under the circumstances, it may be reasonable to in-
fer that ILAS volunteered, that it did not initially intend to charge
for the work its employees performed, and that only in the later
stages of the settlement process did it decide to seek a fee.
At the most basic level, the classification of attorneys as volun-
teers or fee-seekers turns on facts. Do they intend to charge for
their services or not? It is clear that many attorneys offer themselves
for the role of class counsel precisely because they hope to be paid.
John C. Coffee, Jr., a leading commentator on damages class ac-
tions, believes that the pursuit of fees often drives these lawsuits
from start to finish.' 3 ' Many civil rights lawyers, including some
who are in the business of providing legal aid, also expect fees.
Practitioners frequently debate fee award issues at civil rights con-
ferences, and the civil rights bar zealously guards the opportunities
its members have to collect fees.' 3 2
129 It seems likely that the belief that legal aid attorneys are volunteers influenced
the Supreme Court's decisions inJeffD. and Delaware Valley II. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475
U.S. 717, 721 nn.2-3, reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 728 n.10 (1987) (Delaware Valley II)
(White, J., plurality opinion).
130 JeffD., 475 U.S. at 726-30 (arguing that attorneys who handle class actions have
strong economic incentives to settle cheaply and to support collusive settlements that
offer large fees but little relief on the merits).
131 See, e.g., Coffee, Plaintiffs'Attorney, supra note 26.
132 For example, the civil rights bar actively supported the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S1018 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1990), which contained a number of provisions that would make it easier for lawyers to
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The factual nature of the inquiry notwithstanding, there are two
reasons for believing that courts should presume that class action
attorneys intend to charge. First, it is well recognized that "[t]he
fact that [a] person acting is in the business of supplying the things
or is acting in the course of his profession, is evidence of an intent
to charge."' 3 3 All attorneys act in their professional capacities when
they handle class actions. It is therefore appropriate to presume
that all attorneys who act as class counsel expect to be paid. Nor
does the fact that legal aid lawyers are in the business of providing
free legal services invalidate the presumption with respect to them.
Although the law generally obligates legal aid organizations to re-
frain from charging the clients they represent, 3 4 it permits them to
accept fee awards from defendants on their clients' behalf,'3 5 and
legal aid agencies typically use contracts to acquire the right to re-
cover fees their clients are entitled to receive. It is therefore more
accurate to describe legal aid lawyers and organizations as contin-
gent fee practitioners who work for fee awards than as donors who
provide services without intending to charge. Courts should pre-
sume that legal aid attorneys intend to charge when they handle
cases that generate the kinds of fees the law permits them to accept.
The second reason for presuming that lawyers who wage class
actions intend to charge is that there is no background understand-
ing that lawyers work for free, as, for example, there is a background
understanding that a person who hosts a party will not charge for
the refreshments he or she provides. The vast bulk of legal services
are provided through markets for paying clients.' 36 Although pri-
vate lawyers do some pro bono work and public interest lawyers serve
many clients for free, the conventional wisdom is surely not that
lawyers are volunteers. If there is a convention, it is that lawyers
expect to be paid for their time, except when they expressly indicate
a desire to work for free in advance. When they do express such a
recover fees. The text of the attorneys' fee provision can be found in H.R. REP. No.
101-755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990). For testimony by civil rights lawyers in support
of the bill, see serial numbers 101-91, 92 & 93; House Committee on Education & La-
bor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1990. Publications like the NATIONAL LAWYERS GuILD, CIVIL
RIGHTs LIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK (Barbara M. Wolvovitz ed.
1988) also reflect civil rights lawyers' desire to collect fees.
133 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 114 comment c; D. DOBBS, supra note 64,
§ 4.9.
134 Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 729 n.10.
135 For example, any fee award granted inJeffD. would have been paid to ILAS. Jeff
D., 475 U.S. at 721 nn.2-3. See Robert V. Percival 8 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attor-
ney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 233 (Winter 1984)
(argument for granting fee awards to legal aid offices).
136 Expenditures on legal services amounted to $62.3 billion in 1987. U.S. BuREAu
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 1
(1990).
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wish, they have no right to fees, but such cases are the exception,
not the default.
D. Absent Plaintiffs Either Voluntarily Accept Benefits or Have
No Opportunity to Decline Them
Courts sometimes fault providers who seek restitution for fail-
ing to withhold benefits from recipients. For example, if I sought
compensation after lending a friend my truck, a court might deny
my claim on the ground that I should have withheld permission to
use the truck until my friend agreed to pay. However, a court would
be wrong to condemn a provider in a case where access to a benefit
was beyond a provider's ability to control. I cannot prevent my
neighbors from breathing oxygen produced by trees on my ' land.
Consequently, if I were to ask them to pay for the benefits they en-
joy, a court would be wrong to fault me for failing to keep the oxy-
gen to myself.13 7
The enjoyment of some benefits can be regulated, but the en-
joyment of others cannot. Where it is practicable to restrict access,
goods are said to be "exclusive." Exclusive goods can be supplied
to one person at a time. For example, hamburgers are exclusive
goods. By contrast, access to "nonexclusive" goods is difficult to
control. All members of a relevant population can enjoy them at the
same time. National defense is a nonexclusive good. All citizens
enjoy the security it provides when any do. 138
To say that a nonexclusive good must be supplied to all mem-
bers of a group is not to say that all members must consume it.
Only some nonexclusive goods have the property of forced con-
sumption. For example, a radio broadcast is a nonexclusive good
which lacks the quality of forced consumption. When a signal goes
out, everyone within the broadcast area can receive it, but no one is
forced to tune in. Listeners have a choice. In that respect, radio
broadcasts differ from national defense, which benefits all citizens
automatically, including citizens who may prefer to do without
protection. I will call nonexclusive goods like radio broadcasts that
can be rejected "collective goods." Nonexclusive goods like na-
137 This example appears trivial, but its appearance may be deceiving. A study con-
ducted at Michigan State University, the results of which were summarized in a newspa-
per report, determined that during a 50-year lifespan a single tree produces $31,250
worth of oxygen and $62,000 worth of pollution control. Austin American-Statesman,
Apr. 11, 1990, at F1. More than 50 trees surround my house. If the report can be taken
at face value, my neighbors and I share about $93,250 in benefits produced by my trees
each year.
138 On the properties of goods, see Arneson, supra note 38, at 618-19; Charles Sil-
ver, Utilitarian Participation, 23 Soc. ScI. INFO. 701, 711-13 (1984); Duncan Snidal, Public
Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organization, 23 INr'L STUD. Q. 532 (1979).
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tional defense the consumption of which is forced I will call "public
goods." 39
Because the enjoyment of public goods is forced, people do not
really accept benefits that flow from public goods. "One cannot vol-
untarily accept a good one cannot voluntarily reject."' 40 The bene-
fits of public goods are merely received. By contrast, collective
goods and exclusive goods can be accepted because consumers
choose to enjoy them or not.
The differences between exclusive, collective, and public goods
matter. A person who seeks restitution after supplying an exclusive
good like a hamburger can be faulted for failing to withhold the
good in the absence of an agreement to pay. A person who supplies
a collective good by sending a radio signal is immune to this criti-
cism because access to broadcasts is difficult to control. The same is
true of a person who supplies a public good by being inoculated
against a contagious disease. People cannot supply themselves with
collective goods without making them available to others as well.
Consumers can, however, decline to use collective goods. Con-
sequently, they can be faulted for failing to reject collective goods
when they have the chance. The same is true of people who con-
sume exclusive goods. Acceptance of exclusive and collective goods
can therefore logically serve as the basis for obligations to pay. By
contrast, no fault can attach to the consumption of public goods,
because recipients cannot reject benefits public goods provide. Nor
can producers be faulted for failing to limit access to public goods,
since they lack the power to do so. If obligations to pay for public
goods ever exist, mere receipt of benefits is all that can be required.
Traditionally, the degree of fault a person bears, either from
accepting a benefit that could have been rejected or failing to limit
access to a benefit that could have been withheld, has affected the
strength of claims for restitution. As a general rule, a person who
fails to restrict access when it is practicable to do so, that is, a person
who freely supplies an exclusive good, will be denied restitution.
For example, a person who performs a service (i.e., an exclusive
good) in the mistaken belief that an agreement has been made is not
entitled to restitution. 14' The provider's failure to withhold the ser-
vice pending an actual agreement is fatal to the claim. By contrast, a
provider can secure payment from a recipient who knows of the pro-
139 My terminology follows that of Arneson, supra note 38, at 619. Arneson devel-
ops the connections between the properties of goods and the conditions under which
people can be obligated to pay for goods. Id. at 620-21.
140 Id. at 619.
141 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, §§ 40, 71.
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vider's mistake and allows the service to be supplied.' 42 The recipi-
ent's fault in accepting the service offsets the provider's failure to
withhold.
Now consider an example drawn from a time when debts were
less freely assignable than they are today. B paid money owed by A
to C to protect A's good name. Under the law prevailing at the time
the Restatement of Restitution was drafted, B had no claim to repay-
ment from A. 14 3 Now suppose B paid A's debt because B held a
junior mortgage on A's property and feared that C, the senior mort-
gagee, would foreclose if not paid, in which event the value of B's
interest would sharply decline. B would then have been entitled to
reimbursement from A on the theory that B could not withhold a
benefit from A and protect the junior interest at the same time.14 4
Because B could not exclude A, B's failure to exclude A was
excused.' 45
Notice also that in the preceding example A's receipt of a bene-
fit was forced. The same was true in the cotenancy example. 146 The
passive cotenant automatically benefitted when the property was im-
proved. Neither A nor the passive cotenant could easily have
avoided their gains. Nevertheless, the law grants the active cotenant
a remedy in the form of the right of partition, just as it allowed B a
remedy above. In general, the fact that a recipient could not avoid a
benefit does not bar a grant of restitution, nor should it. The con-
ception of justice as reciprocity connects the enjoyment of benefits
to the payment of compensation. It does not limit restitution to
cases where recipients could choose to reject the benefits they
receive.
Absent plaintiffs are often entirely blameless, in the sense of
being unable to reject benefits they receive. When class actions pro-
duce public goods like reapportionment, environmental protection,
and institutional reform, absent plaintiffs receive benefits they have
little choice but to accept. Their conduct is therefore entirely above
reproach. By contrast, in cases that produce damage awards, absent
plaintiffs can reject benefits. They need merely refrain from filing
claims. Even so, the act of accepting benefits increases absent plain-
tiffs' culpability only slightly. All that can be inferred from the fact
of acceptance is that an absent plaintiff would rather have a benefit
142 Id.
143 Id. § 112 comment a, illustration I; id § 43 comment a.
144 Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 21, at 1437-38.
145 IfB could have protected the junior interest without benefittingA, B would have
had difficulty securing compensation from A. Id at 1440-41.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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than not. One cannot draw the stronger conclusion that absent
plaintiffs agree to pay for benefits they willingly accept.
Plaintiffs' attorneys who win class actions are, however, also
blameless. The law gives named plaintiffs the right to initiate class
suits, and class actions can be efficacious means of vindicating
named plaintiffs' claims.147 By filing class actions, in other words,
lawyers perform actions calculated to benefit their clients. Once
class actions are certified, lawyers cannot restrict access to the bene-
fits they help produce. All absent plaintiffs are entitled to enjoy the
benefits class actions provide. Classwide damage awards are there-
fore collective goods: all absent plaintiffs can benefit, yet they can
also reject a benefit by failing to file a claim. Classwide injunctions,
however, are public goods: all absent plaintiffs benefit automati-
cally. Because attorneys cannot limit absent plaintiffs' access to re-
lief, they cannot be faulted for failing to withhold benefits from
absent plaintiffs who decline to pay.
The situation in a class action is thus that attorneys are blame-
less for failing to restrict absent class members' access to benefits,
because counsel cannot restrict supply. The law of restitution
should therefore recognize attorneys' requests for compensation,
even though claims brought by people who allow others access to
goods are often barred. The propriety of paying attorneys is clear-
est in damages actions because class members have the power to
reject benefits and to avoid incurring obligations to pay fees by re-
fraining from filing claims in damages cases. In damages class ac-
tions, the existence of an obligation to pay attorneys' fees can and
should be made contingent on a class member's decision to accept a
payment. By contrast, the obligation to pay fees in injunctive and
declaratory class actions is conditioned on the receipt of benefits
alone. Class members cannot reject the benefits these class actions
supply. Obligations therefore arise in the absence of acceptance
merely because class members reap what their attorneys sow. They
pay fees, even though their conduct is blameless, because that is the
distributively just result.
E. Absent Plaintiffs Are Better Off Receiving Benefits and
Paying Attorneys' Fees than Doing Without Benefits
Entirely
Judges often decline to compensate providers when by doing so
they risk forcing recipients into disadvantageous exchanges. 148 If a
judge ordered me to pay one hundred dollars to the gardener who
147 See supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
148 See Levmore, supra note 25, at 69-72 (discussing judges' disinclination to tackle
valuation problems).
1991]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tends my neighbor's yard, I could reasonably protest that the bene-
fits I receive are worth less than that amount. It would be impossi-
ble to disprove my complaint. Condition (5) takes my complaint
seriously. It limits the existence of obligations to cases where, even
after paying compensation, recipients are unambiguously better off.
Many cases support condition (5). Judges typically deny claims
for restitution presented by people who provide unsolicited services
in part because they perceive that:
[flrequently it would be unfair to the person benefitted by services
to require payment since, although benefitted, he may reasonably
be unwilling to pay the price; he does not have the opportunity of
return, which usually exists in the case of things received, nor the
definite and certain pecuniary advantage which ensues where
money has been paid. 149
The difficulty judges perceive is the problem of wealth depen-
dency; 150 a person's willingness to purchase an item can be affected
by his or her level of wealth. Suppose homeowner A purifies the
water in an aquifer by removing a tank from which pollutants had
been leaking. A's action automatically benefits other homeowners,
including B, who also use wells. A's act makes B better off, but, even
so, B may be unwilling to pay; it may be that B would not have paid
anything at all to have the tank removed himself:
[B] may genuinely not want [the] benefit that is forced upon him,
even though its market value may be greater than the amount of
restitution sought by [A]. [B] . . . can maintain that the value of
purification is wealth dependent. If he were wealthier [he] would
include water purification among his basket of purchases, but at
his present income level the benefit is almost worthless. 151
B could truthfully assert that at his present level of income he would
not have paid a positive price to have the tank removed.
Because the preceding example may seem farfetched-surely B
would pay something for clean water!-consider another based on
Goldberg v. Kelly,' 52 a famous due process class action that entitled
welfare recipients to hearings prior to the termination of aid. Sup-
pose that after Goldberg, welfare recipients received bills for attor-
neys' fees. They could rightly complain that at their income level
they would not have purchased the benefits they received. A
pretermination hearing, although valuable, may be a luxury for
which a welfare recipient cannot afford to pay.
149 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 40 comment a.
150 The problem of wealth dependency is discussed in Levmore, supra note 25, at 74-
79.
151 Id at 77.
152 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Tenants who fail to collect all their possessions could lodge the
same complaint if landlords could charge them for storage costs. 153
They could plausibly contend that they would rather forsake the for-
gotten goods than pay the required fee. For that reason, the law
offers tenants a choice. They can reclaim forgotten goods and pay
reasonable storage costs or they can disclaim goods entirely and
leave landlords with the bills. 1M Because tenants are given the op-
tion of rejecting forgotten goods, we can be sure they are better off
when they decide to recover goods despite having to bear storage
expenses.
Giving recipients the option of rejecting benefits is just one of
many techniques judges use to handle problems of wealth depen-
dency. Recall the example in which an active cotenant installed a
swimming pool for which a passive cotenant refused to help pay.' 55
A judge would not allow the active cotenant to hold the passive co-
tenant personally liable for a share of the cost, because the passive
cotenant could then reasonably complain that he or she would have
"preferred other expenditures over the improvement to the coten-
ancy" regardless of the price. 156 But a judge would recognize a
claim for compensation if the active cotenant were to seek partition.
The active cotenant could then recover the value the pool added to
the sales price of the land. This approach recognizes the validity of
the active cotenant's claim and preserves the passive cotenant from
economic loss. If the judge assesses the pool's value accurately, the
passive cotenant's share of the sales price should equal the amount
he or she would have received if the land had been sold without the
pool. The remedy of partition thus reduces the risk that a passive
cotenant will be forced to pay for an unwanted improvement.
The policy of compensating doctors who provide emergency
care is the exception that tests the rule. 157 Patients who are ordered
to pay doctors can complain that they would have declined offers of
assistance if they had been conscious at the time. This complaint
would have special force if made by a patient who would have recov-
ered in any event, or if made by the estate of a decedent who was
beyond help at the time medical assistance was supplied.
Nevertheless, the law orders patients to pay physicians on the
ground that emergency care is worth more than a doctor's going
rate when there is any chance that a patient can be saved. 158 That
1-5 See supra text accompanying notes 126-28 (discussion of landlord/tenant
example).
154 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 117 comment d, illustrations 6-7.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
156 Levmore, supra note 25, at 78.
157 See supra note 109.
158 "Where the services of a physician have been rendered to an unconscious person
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conclusion seems right. Most people are willing to spend money to
save their lives. In a particular case, the assumption that a patient
would have solicited a doctor's assistance may be incorrect, because
some people have idiosyncratic tastes. But experience suggests that
the number of exceptions is extremely small.
Alas, lawyers lack the power to heal; by waging class actions,
they rarely save absent plaintiffs' lives. Therefore, lawyers should
not be able to hold absent plaintiffs personally liable for fees. In-
deed, lawyers cannot bill absent plaintiffs directly. 159 They can
recoup fees and expenses only by means that generally comport
with condition (5).160
In Pettus, for example, creditors had to contribute five percent
of the value of their claims in payment of attorneys' fees when claim-
ing their share of the judgment.161 Creditors were therefore free to
decide whether the benefit was worth the price, an easy decision
given that the assets secured by thejudgment were sufficient to pay
all creditors in full. 16 2 Because creditors were given a choice, one
can be confident that those who joined the case were better off even
after paying fees.
Condition (5) is also satisfied in cases where fee-shifting stat-
utes require losing defendants to pay plaintiffs' fees. Absent plain-
tiffs are unambiguously better off in fee-shifting cases, because they
receive relief and suffer no out-of-pocket expense. Absent plaintiffs
can "hardly claim that they would be better off without the bonanza
that remains after a fee to the provider is subtracted."1 63
Finally, when attorneys' fees are paid from common funds, fees
and expenses are paid off the top and absent plaintiffs share what
remains. Again, absent plaintiffs' personal assets remain intact.
They receive an unambiguous benefit in the form of an addition to
wealth that would not have occurred but for the class action.
Some forced exchanges of fees for relief can make absent plain-
tiffs worse off, even when the mechanisms described above are em-
ployed. When class actions settle, absent plaintiffs lose the right to
sue, a right that may be more valuable to them than the relief they
in an emergency it is assumed that, if properly rendered, the one receiving them benefits
by having had a better chance of recovery although in fact no recovery is effected."
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT), supra note 10, § 155 comment d.
159 H. NEWBERG, supra note 100, § 14.02.
160 The fear of forcing absent plaintiffs to pay more than they deem benefits to be
worth also offers an alternative explanation of the practice of paying only lawyers who
win. Absent plaintiffs can reasonably complain that services of losing attorneys are
worth nothing to them.
161 Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128 (1885).
162 Id. at 126.
163 Levmore, supra note 25, at 97.
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receive. It is therefore possible for absent plaintiffs to complain that
they would rather do without the benefits class actions provide than
purchase those benefits at the required price.
Pettus-type mechanisms are immune to this complaint, 64 but it
nonetheless states a real concern. There is reason to fear that ab-
sent plaintiffs with high value claims may fare worse in class actions
than they do suing alone, apparently because weak claims dilute the
appeal of class actions and drive down per capita recoveries.1 65 Re-
sponsibility may also rest with plaintiffs' lawyers who shortchange
absent plaintiffs with high value claims.166 Finally, it is often difficult
and unacceptably expensive for judges to take all differences among
plaintiffs into account when fashioning plans of relief. 67 They ig-
nore many differences that might plausibly affect plaintiffs' recov-
eries in separate suits. The problem of prejudice to absent plaintiffs
with high value claims is most acute in damages cases, but it occurs
in injunctive cases as well. There is no way to guarantee that class
actions will secure reforms that make absent plaintiffs as well off as
they would have been had they waged individual suits.
In order to assess the problem of inadequate returns, let us first
set aside cases in which the problem is unlikely to arise. Inadequate
benefits cause no difficulties when absent plaintiffs' claims are uni-
formly small. When no plaintiff's claim is large enough to support a
conventional suit, the expected value of all claims outside a class
action is nil. Any relief won in a class action is therefore a net bene-
fit for all plaintiffs.
A surprising number of class suits fall into this category.' 68
Nevertheless, many class actions, perhaps most, involve some plain-
tiffs who could sue on their own.' 69 These cases fall into one of two
groups: those in which damages are claimed and those brought
mainly for injunctive relief. In damages cases, absent plaintiffs who
164 The mechanism used in Pettus required absent plaintiffs who wished to partici-
pate to opt into the class. Absent plaintiffs who believed they could fare better on their
own could easily protect themselves by remaining passive.
165, Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 906-07. For general discussions
of conflicts of interest in class actions, see Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interest in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YA.E L.J. 470 (1976); Julius
Chambers, Class Action Litigation: Representing Divergent Interests of Class Members, 4 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 353 (1979); Rhode, supra note 94.
166 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 917.
167 See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,114, at 76,718 (S.D. Tx.), aft'd, 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1981).
168 See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974) (six dollar average
recovery per plaintiff after trebling); In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig.,
1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,680, at 69,467 (D. Conn. 1983) (alleged damages ranged
from $32 to $75 per plaintiff); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (alleged damages of one dollar per plaintiff).
169 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 26, at 906.
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hold large claims can protect themselves by opting out and preserv-
ing their right to file independent suits.1i T It is therefore fair to say
that large-claim plaintiffs who fail to exclude themselves assume the
risk of inadequate returns. 171 That is not to say that the problem of
inadequate returns in damages cases can safely be ignored. Ideally,
per capita recoveries in class actions should equal or exceed the
amounts plaintiffs win in individual suits. But there can be no guar-
antees; rough justice is always the rule in class actions because class
actions necessarily reduce the amount of attention individual claims
receive. That is the risk assumed by absent plaintiffs who decide to
stay in a class; the risk that some meaningful attributes of individual
claims may be ignored.1 72
Because absent plaintiffs cannot exclude themselves from class
actions that seek primarily injunctive relief,173 they do not assume
the risk of inadequate returns in injunctive cases. Still, in injunctive
cases, absent plaintiffs with high value claims have little cause for
complaint. Even if they could exclude themselves on demand, they
could not prevent other plaintiffs from suing as a class and could not
insulate themselves from the effects of prior or contemporaneous
class suits. Suppose a prisoner were to opt out of an institutional
reform class action and then file a separate suit. The prisoner's suit
would probably be consolidated with the class action.' 74 The two
suits would then proceed together, the class action in the lead and
the independent suit tagging along. The result reached in the class
action would inevitably dictate the outcome of the prisoner's suit.
Similarly, if the prisoner were to file suit after the class action had
come to an end, a victory for the class would alter the terms of the
prisoner's incarceration, because the prison itself would be re-
formed. Consequently, the class action relief would alter the pris-
170 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) applies only to class actions certified
under Rule 23(b)(3).
171 The decision to remain in a class, despite the prospect of receiving inadequate
returns, may be rational. Class actions offer advantages as well as disadvantages, the
chief advantage being reduced per capita litigation costs. In conventional lawsuits, at-
torneys' fees typically consume from 331/s% to 40%o of plaintiffs' gains. H. NEWBERG,
supra note 1, § 2.08, at 52-53. Attorneys' fees in class actions usually fall in the 20%o to
30%o range. Id. § 2.08, at 52. Reduced costs may offset reduced gains.
172 To be clear, the common law of class actions does not counsel imperfection.
The law requires judges to approve only class action settlements that are "fair, reason-
able and adequate from the perspective of the absent class members." Plummer v.
Chemical Bank, 91 F.R.D. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982).
The law also requires judges to consider the relative size and strength of absent plain-
tiffs' claims when dividing settlement funds among the members of a class. H. NEw-
BERG, supra note 100, ch. 11. These requirements attempt to ensure that absent
plaintiffs are treated fairly. They counsel perfection, but perfection cannot be achieved.
173 Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975).
174 See FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
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oner's position and perhaps render her claim moot. If the class
were to lose, adverse precedents and possibly even the preclusion
doctrine would limit the prisoner's ability to press an independent
claim. 175 In cases seeking structural relief, the fates of all victims
necessarily intertwine. 176
The problem of inadequate returns in injunctive class actions is
thus more illusory than real. The value of individual injunctive suits
changes when class actions are filed. But plaintiffs who prefer to sue
alone cannot complain, because they have no right to prevent others
from adjudicating their rights as a group. The relevant comparison
is between the relief plaintiffs actually receive from class actions and
the relief they would receive if they were permitted to opt out of
injunctive class actions and file separate suits. In all likelihood, the
relief enjoyed by individual victims would be roughly the same.
F. Interim Conclusion: Fee Awards in Successful Class Actions
Are Justified on Restitutionary Grounds
The practice of paying attorneys who win class actions is gener-
ally consistent with the law of restitution and its underlying princi-
ples. Absent plaintiffs benefit from the services attorneys provide.
Consequently, the conception of justice as reciprocity or fair re-
quital requires absent plaintiffs to pay reasonable compensation in
return. However, that simple statement by itself does not suffice.
The law does not order recipients to pay restitution when providers
fail to take advantage of opportunities to bargain; when providers
have adequate incentives to supply goods without beneficiaries'
help; when providers confer benefits as gifts; when providers can
withhold benefits from recipients who decline to pay; or when bene-
ficiaries can plausibly claim that forced exchanges of benefits for
compensation leave them worse off. None of these exceptions
presents an obstacle to granting fee awards in successful class ac-
tions. Therefore, the desire for distributive justice can properly be
put into play.
III
RESPONDING TO DAwSON
John P. Dawson, a leading scholar of the law of restitution, criti-
cized the idea that attorneys who handle class actions are entitled to
compensation from absent plaintiffs. This Part defends the argu-
175 Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. LJ. 507 (1987).
176 "Structural injunctions attempt to restructure institutions that are systematically
violating the law or whose very structure is unlawful. School desegregation cases and
antitrust divestiture cases are typical examples." D. LAYCOCK, supra note 122, at 239
(citing OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8-12 (1978)).
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ment of the preceding Part from the attack Dawson waged. The
time is ripe to reconsider Dawson's views. In Blum v. Stenson, 177 the
Supreme Court stated in dictum that attorneys who win common
fund class actions are entitled to a percentage of the gains they help
produce. At the time, lower court judges had abandoned percent-
age formulas in favor of the hourly-rate based, lodestar approach. 17
Recently, however, fee award practices have begun to change, and
some judges now support a return to the percentage approach.' 79
Dawson resolutely opposed percentage fees and thought they could
not be justified on restitutionary grounds.' 80 If his reasons are
sound, judges would be right to stay with the lodestar approach.
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court first recognized an attor-
ney's right to claim compensation from a common fund in Central
Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus. 18 1 Dawson condemned that decision
in no uncertain terms. He thought that the Supreme Court "was
quite unaware of what it was doing" when it decided the case' 8 2 and
he called the lawyers' request for additional compensation "far-
fetched."' 83 Dawson attributed the positive reception given Pettus in
the lower courts to "the strong fellow-feeling ofjudges for brothers
in the guild."' 8 4
Given Dawson's antipathy toward Pettus, it may seem surprising
that he endorsed an earlier, related Supreme Court decision, Trustees
v. Greenough,185 where the Court held that the named plaintiff, Vose,
was entitled to repayment from a common fund for fees and ex-
penses he paid when suing on behalf of a class. 186 Vose was entitled
to reimbursement because the absent plaintiffs were enriched at his
expense.
Given Dawson's support of Greenough, it is difficult to see why
Pettus caused him so much concern. The net effect of reimbursing
Vose, who paid attorney fees in advance, was to transfer money
from the absent plaintiffs to the lawyers. It seems a matter of indif-
ference whether lawyers receive compensation directly from com-
177 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
178 D. LAYcOCK, supra note 122, at 864.
179 See, e.g., In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (announc-
ing flat 30% fee in securities cases).
180 See generally Dawson, supra note 20; Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21.
181 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
182 Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21, at 1653.
183 Id at 1604; see also Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 2 1, at 1458 ("It seems unlikely
that anyone other than a lawyer would have the temerity to suggest that, having received
... the return he agreed to accept, he should secure from a stranger an extra reward.").
184 Dawson, Fees From Funds, supra note 21, at 1653.
185 105 U.S. 527 (1881). For Dawson's remarks on Greenough, see Dawson, supra
note 20, at 849-54; Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21, at 1652-53.
186 Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532.
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mon funds or indirectly by requiring money to pass through named
plaintiffs' hands.18 7 Dawson was, however, hardly indifferent. He
denounced Pettus in righteous terms because he believed the prac-
tice of paying lawyers directly reflected the widespread but mistaken
"conception . . . that the litigating lawyer is an independent,
profitmaking entrepreneur."1 8 8 Dawson viewed attorneys not as en-
trepreneurs but as agents who are contractually obligated to serve
the clients they represent (i.e., named plaintiffs). 8 9 For that reason,
he firmly believed that lawyers who help create common funds are
entitled to only the amount of compensation their clients agree to
pay. The Restatement of Restitution declares that "[a] person who, inci-
dentally to the performance of his own duty... confer[s] a benefit
upon another, is not.., entitled to contribution."' 190 Because law-
yers are contractually obligated to represent their signed clients, in-
cluding named plaintiffs, Dawson believed lawyers have no right to
additional compensation from nonclients, including absent plain-
tiffs, who benefit when lawsuits create common funds.
The heart of Dawson's position is that a person who acts pursu-
ant to a contract has no right to restitution from an incidental bene-
ficiary.' 9 1 As a general matter, that is surely correct. The gardener
who tends my neighbor's yard has no right to compensation from
me, even though I enjoy gazing at my neighbor's beautiful lawn. My
neighbor has to pay because he hired the gardener, but I do not.
Because I benefit incidentally from the gardener's performance of a
contractual obligation, the law of restitution denies the gardener the
option of collecting from me. 192 Dawson argued that class counsel
have no right to compensation from absent plaintiffs because coun-
sel bear the same relation to absent plaintiffs as my neighbor's gar-
dener does to me.
If one strictly construes established restitutionary doctrine, one
must condemn the result in Greenough. Section 106 of the Restatement
of Restitution, on which Dawson relied when inveighing against attor-
neys' claims for compensation from incidental beneficiaries, also de-
nies compensation to persons who provide benefits to others
"incidentally . . . to the protection or the improvement of [their]
own things."' 93 Vose, the named plaintiff in Greenough, sought pri-
187 Levmore, supra note 25, at 96.
188 Dawson, supra note 20, at 854.
189 Id; see also Berger, supra note 25, at 318 (similar opinion offered as a reason for
compensating attorneys on an hourly rate basis).
190 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 106.
191 Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21, at 1603-08; Dawson, Intermeddler, supra
note 21, at 1410-12.
192 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 106 comment a, illustration 3.
193 Id. § 106.
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marily to protect his own interests by waging that suit. If the Restate-
ment is gospel, it would seem that the absent plaintiffs who shared in
the fund Vose helped create were entitled to a free ride at Vose's
expense.
Nevertheless, Dawson thought that Vose was rightly repaid. 194
He believed that because the existence of the common fund derived
from Vose's outlays for attorneys, the basic requirement of restitu-
tion, enrichment at another's expense, was met in that case. Daw-
son also believed that Vose's case satisfied the other relevant
requirements imposed by the law of restitution. Vose was justified
in attempting to enforce his own rights, he could not do so without
helping others at the same time, and he did not offer his services as
a gift. Moreover, the absent plaintiffs contributed nothing to their
own enrichment: they merely sat back while Vose sued. Finally, no
practical considerations rendered a decision in Vose's favor unwise,
because the common fund was necessarily within the control of the
court. For these reasons, Dawson concluded that the payment to
Vose "merely distributed his loss" in an appropriate way.195
Dawson's reasons for endorsing Greenough are remarkably simi-
lar to the reasons offered here in Parts I and II in support of the
practice of paying attorneys who win class actions. Since Dawson
and I agree on the essential content of the law of restitution, and
since he was willing to ignore the strict language of the Restatement
when arguing that named plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement
when they pay attorneys' fees in advance, why do we differ as to
whether attorneys are entitled to be paid directly from common
funds? We disagree because we answer the question "Do contracts
between attorneys and named plaintiffs establish the reasonable
value of attorneys' time?" in different ways.
Dawson answered "yes." He believed that the attorneys who
waged Pettus were fully compensated when they received the con-
tract price from the named plaintiffs, because that was what they
agreed to accept when they took the case. The attorneys therefore
suffered no loss, according to Dawson, and could not plausibly claim
that the absent plaintiffs benefitted at their expense.
Dawson is making an analytical claim: one who agrees to per-
form a service in return for a payment of a specified size is necessar-
ily made whole upon receipt of the contract price. Is that true? The
Pettus Court did not think so. Uncontroverted evidence convinced
the Court that the attorneys intentionally charged the named plain-
194 The following account of Dawson's reasons for endorsing Greenough is drawn
from Dawson, supra note 20, at 850-54; Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21, at 1652;
Dawson, Intermeddler, supra note 21, at 1418.
195 Dawson, supra note 20, at 851.
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tiffs a subnormal rate in hopes of winning the case and securing ad-
ditional payments from the absent plaintiffs.196 Taking the
attorneys' normal billing rate as the baseline, the Court concluded
that the contract undercompensated the attorneys and that the at-
torneys were entitled to a supplemental wage.
The Court's assessment is entirely plausible. Although most
fee agreements reflect the reasonable value of attorneys' time, con-
tracts used in class actions typically do not. In securities and anti-
trust class actions, attorneys commonly "waive fees for individual
clients," so that the amount pledged by named plaintiffs is effec-
tively nil.' 97 In mass tort cases, the market Value of attorneys' time
often greatly exceeds the size of named plaintiffs' claims, let alone
the amounts named plaintiffs agree to pay. 198 The same is true in
civil rights and other cases where classes seek broad-based injunc-
tive relief.
By giving named plaintiffs discounts, attorneys react to named
plaintiffs' reluctance to sign contracts obligating them to pay
thousands, or even millions, of dollars in fees, and to reimburse
substantial expenses in the event of loss. The numbers would
frighten anyone, even if there were little prospect that such con-
tracts would be enforced. Why subject potential named plaintiffs to
such uncertainty when fees will ultimately be drawn from common
funds? It seems better to hold named plaintiffs liable for nominal
amounts, so as to satisfy the requirement of having clients, and to
allow lawyers to apply directly to courts for fee awards.' 99
The evidence in Pettus suggests that the attorneys saw the wis-
dom of the strategy just described. They offered the named plain-
tiffs a subnormal rate to secure a few clients and gain control of the
case. Then they won the class action and applied for a supplemental
award, believing, correctly as it turned out, that a judge would see
things their way. Thus, an attorney who runs a class action may in-
cur a loss even when paid the amount promised by a named plaintiff.
Payment from a named plaintiff may not reflect the reasonable value
of an attorney's time, where "reasonable value" is defined as an at-
196 Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1885).
197 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 58.
198 Consider In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1296
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987), where fees in
excess of four million dollars were awarded. No plaintiff ever agreed to pay that
amount, nor was any plaintiff's claim large enough to support such a commitment.
199 Even Dawson would have permitted attorneys to bypass named plaintiffs and
claim directly against common funds as "a shortcut" to save named plaintiffs the aggra-
vation of paying fees first and then claiming reimbursement. However, he would have
limited lawyers to the amounts named plaintiffs agreed to pay. Dawson, supra note 20, at
853-54.
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torney's customary billing rate. 200 That is uniformly true in class
actions today. 20 1
Dawson thus misunderstood the nature of bargaining in class
actions;20 2 he believed that attorneys and named plaintiffs negotiate
and settle on normal or reasonable rates. Since that does not hap-
pen, there is no reason to believe that contracts between attorneys
and named plaintiffs accurately value attorneys' time. Moreover, if
judges relied on contracts when awarding fees, attorneys and named
plaintiffs might simply collude by entering into agreements entitling
lawyers to excessive fees. Fees would, after all, still be drawn from
common funds. Because named plaintiffs would be spending absent
plaintiffs' money, contracts entered into by named plaintiffs would
be unreliable guides to the value of attorneys' time.203
Dawson saw that collusion could occur, and therefore subjected
attorneys' fees to two caps. An attorney was to be paid the lesser of
the contract price or the reasonable value, defined as the market
rate, of an attorney's time.20 4 Because ajudge would assess reason-
able value,20 5 Dawson's proposal differs little from current fee
award practice. Judges would routinely assess the reasonable value
200 Professor Berger has observed that:
[a]n attorney may agree to take a case on a basis that will not fully com-
pensate the time and effort to be expended because of the expectation
that the lawsuit will create or preserve a fund for the benefit of a broader
class. To the extent the contract... affords the attorney less than the
market value of his or her time and effort, the attorney has incurred a loss
• . . [that] is the measure of the unjust enrichment to the nonclient
beneficiaries.
Berger, supra note 25, at 299-300. Berger not only failed to see the conflict between his
view and Dawson's, he cited Dawson with approval. Id. at 298-99.
201 In general, contracts between attorneys and named plaintiffs are no~t worth the
paper on which they are written. For example, although contracts routinely obligate
named plaintiffs to reimburse litigation expenses in the event of loss, no one really ex-
pects named plaintiffs to pay. The contractual language exists purely to satisfy the ethi-
cal rule barring attorneys from bearing ultimate liability for expenses and costs.
202 An interesting difference of opinion existed between Dawson and his casebook
collaborator, George E. Palmer. J. DAwsoN & G. PALMER, supra note 58. Palmer wrote
that "[t]he most persuasive case" for awarding attorneys' fees as restitution is
where there is a relatively large number of potential plaintiffs .... In
many such instances it would not be economically feasible for the client
to pay the full value of the lawyer's services. As a practical matter, if the
claim is to be pursued, the lawyer's compensation must come out of the
fund recovered.
2 G. PALMER, supra note 40, § 10.8. Palmer thus appreciated what Dawson did not,
namely, that named plaintiffs may be unable to pay lawyers' customary rates.
203 Cf. Kirchoffv. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,J.) (private
plaintiffs in civil rights litigation, because of fee-shifting statute, do not negotiate with
their own money on the line). Dawson agreed that "[t]he fee fixed in the contract of the
lawyer with his own client.., clearly should not control." Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra
note 21, at 1608 (footnote omitted).
204 Dawson, supra note 20, at 851.
205 Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21, at 1608.
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of attorneys' time, and attorneys would generally receive the
amounts judges decided should be paid. This is what happens in
class actions today. Only attorneys who failed to collude with
named plaintiffs would feel the bite of Dawson's proposal, and it is a
safe bet that few attorneys would make that mistake.
Dawson's reliance on section 106 of the Restatement of Restitution
reveals the breadth of his misunderstanding of class actions. The
Restatement denies compensation to persons whose actions benefit
others "incidentally. ' 20 6 Absent plaintiffs are not incidental benefi-
ciaries; they are intended beneficiaries. This claim is borne out by
the law of class actions, which makes absent plaintiffs' welfare the
central focus of concern. Unless absent plaintiffs are adequately
represented, they cannot be bound by the judgments class actions
produce. 20 7 For that reason, courts have developed a variety of
means for ensuring that attorneys who run class actions give due
regard to absent plaintiffs' interests and rights. For example, the
primary obligation of an attorney who runs a class action is to pro-
tect absent plaintiffs, even when the only way an attorney can do so
is by setting the interests and rights of a named plaintiff, the attor-
ney's actual client, to one side.208 The duties of office outweigh an
attorney's contractual and ethical obligations to a signed client
when a conflict arises.20 9
There is nothing magical or mysterious about class counsel's
legal obligation to represent absent plaintiffs. Fiduciary duties often
arise in the absence of express agreements, as, for example, when
judges appoint guardians to care for wards. 210 Nor is it odd that a
court-appointed fiduciary has a right to compensation. Historically,
court-appointed fiduciaries have been entitled to repayment for a
variety of expenses and costs, even when appointments were made
without beneficiaries' consent.211
Because absent plaintiffs are the intended and legally desig-
nated beneficiaries of attorneys' efforts, it seems inappropriate to
206 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 106.
207 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
208 E.g.,Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 535 (W.D. La. 1976)
(at pretrial stages, counsel owes greater duty to absent class members than to class rep-
resentatives), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978).
209 For discussions of the powers and responsibilities of class counsel, see MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) §§ 20.22, 30, 30.15 (1985); H. NEWBERG, supra note
100, 99 9.34-.35.
210 William F. Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA L. REV. 264,
320-29 (1960).
211 The history of the common law regulating the compensation of trustees, guardi-
ans, executors, and other court-appointed fiduciaries is discussed in 2 FREDERICK
THOMAS WHITE & OWEN DAVIES TUDOR, LEADING CASES IN EqurrY 434-73 (1859).
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apply section 106 of the Restatement to the relationship between an
attorney and a class. Rather, the relationship between an attorney
and a group of absent plaintiffs more closely resembles a quasi-
contractual exchange. 2 12 Judges appoint attorneys to serve absent
plaintiffs and require absent plaintiffs to return the favor by paying
reasonable fees.
But how much should absent plaintiffs pay? Although the per-
centage-of-the-gain formula is enjoying renewed popularity, Daw-
son strongly opposed it. He thought the percentage formula
produced arbitrary results that bore no relation to the time and ef-
fort litigation required.21 3 It is certainly true that the amount of
time and effort attorneys invest in litigation bears no necessary rela-
tion to the size of the funds their efforts produce.21 4 Easy cases can
produce magnificent returns. Further, it is not immediately obvious
that the amounts class members recover should affect the amounts
attorneys are paid.
Quasi-contractual damages usually equal the reasonable or
market value of the service provided. In the words of one commen-
tator, "[q]uasi-contract proceeds on the fiction of an implied prom-
ise to pay .... If there were a real promise, it would probably be to
pay the market value, and the implied promise is analogized to
that."215 It seems appropriate to pay market rates in class actions as
well. Unjust enrichment occurs in class actions because absent
plaintiffs enjoy the fruits of an attorney's labor without purchasing
the right to do so. The remedy should therefore require absent
plaintiffs to pay an amount which, if offered in advance, an attorney
would willingly accept.21 6 The best guess at that amount is an attor-
212 "A quasi contractual obligation is one that is created by the law for reasons of
justice, without any expression of assent and sometimes even against a clear expression
of dissent." 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19 (1963).
213 Dawson, supra note 20, at 852. Modern writers share this concern. For example,
Coffee, a proponent of the percentage formula, believes the percentage granted should
be adjusted to reflect the difficulty a case presents. See Coffee, Plaintif's Attorney, supra
note 26, at 725.
214 The point that there is no necessary connection between the size of providers'
losses and recipients' gains is widely accepted. D. LAycocK, supra note 122, at 466; RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, ch. 8, topic 2, introductory note.
215 D. LAYcOCK, supra note 122, at 488; see also In re Crisan Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 107
N.W.2d 907 (1961) (ordering payment of established rates for hospital and other medi-
cal services); RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 10, § 117 comment d, illustration 7 (pre-
vailing rate for storage of goods); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 40, § 1 comment
h, illustration 10 ("reasonable and usual charge for the [hospital] services").
216 This recommendation is consistent with the purposes that underlie fee-shifting
statutes. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Congress
has directed trial courts to "ascertain the fee at which competent counsel would be will-
ing to accept meritorious civil rights cases"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), rev'd sub
nom. Save Our Cumberland Mtns., Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The payment of wages attorneys would have accepted also comports with "the fun-
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ney's usual and customary rate.21 7
One could dispute the claim that lawyers would agree to wage
class actions in return for the same fees they receive in conventional
cases by observing that the mix of risks and opportunities present in
class actions differs from the mix in conventional cases. 218 The
problem with encouraging judges to tailor fees in light of risks is
that judges often cannot know whether, in a given case, the balance
is relatively favorable to an attorney or not. And even if a judge
were fairly sure that the balance tipped one way or the other, the
magnitude of the difference between a conventional case and a class
action might still be unclear.219 There is moreover the likelihood of
encouraging litigation over the risks class actions entail. Given
judges' limitations and the desire to avoid fee disputes, the simplest
solution may also be the best, and the simplest solution is to assume
the adequacy of prevailing rates. 220
Judges usually equate a provider's customary rate with the
amount a provider actually charges. Courts rely on evidence of nor-
mal billings unless a recipient can show that a particular provider is
considerably out of line with the local market.22' Judges often em-
damental principle of [compensatory] damages[, which] is to restore the injured party as
nearly as possible to the position he would have been in but for the wrong." D. LAY-
cocK, supra note 122, at 14. The "wrong" is that absent plaintiffs enjoy the benefits of
attorneys' efforts without purchasing the right to do so. By awarding damages calcu-
lated to place attorneys in the position they would have been in if bargains had been
struck in advance, the moral impulse behind the fundamental principle is served.
217 It seems reasonable that the price would fall somewhere between the total
amount a class stands to gain and an attorney's opportunity wage, i.e., the amount of
income an attorney could earn by working on other cases. See Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786
F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1986); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONoMIcs 474-75 (10th ed. 1976).
It is difficult to say much more, however, because the combinations of risks and opportu-
nities that class actions present vary greatly from case to case.
218 The peculiar risks and advantages of class actions are discussed in H. NEWBERG,
supra note 100, ch. 2.
219 The difficulties that arise when judges attempt to adjust prevailing rates are well
known. See Laffey, 746 F.2d at 18-25; Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 485-88.
220 Reliance on prevailing or customary rates can also be justified on the ground that
such rates provide the best measure of attorneys' real opportunity costs. Laffey, 746 F.2d
at 24 ("established rates represent the opportunity cost of what the firm turned away in
order to take the litigation; they represent the lawyers' own assessment of the value of
their time"). Laycock observes that in some cases "enrichment is unjust only to the
extent of [a] plaintiff's cost" and that in those cases "compensatory damages may some-
times be the appropriate remedy for a substantive liability based in unjust enrichment."
Laycock, supra note 10, at 1285-86. If the aim of fee awards is to prevent absent plain-
tiffs from benefitting at attorneys' expense, compensatory awards based on attorneys'
opportunity costs should suffice.
221 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 40, § 3 comment a, illustration 1
(hospital that admits unconscious patient entitled to "the amount of its usual and rea-
sonable charge").
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ploy the same technique when sizing fee awards. 222 When attorneys
who wage class actions also represent plaintiffs in conventional
cases at established hourly rates, judges base fee awards on those
rates. For example, an attorney who routinely receives $150 per
hour when representing clients privately is ordinarily deemed to
have a $150 hourly rate.223
However, only a minority of attorneys who represent plaintiffs
in conventional cases bill by the hour. Most charge contingent per-
centage fees. 224 In class actions and other cases waged by contin-
gent fee practitioners, courts must decide whether to base fee
awards on the percentage an attorney normally charges, on a per-
centage otherwise derived, or on a surrogate hourly rate.225 Not all
of these options are available in every case. It is impossible to use
percentages in declaratory judgment and injunctive reform class ac-
tions. The full range of options exists only when plaintiffs win mon-
etary relief.
But suppose a class were to win a damage award of ten million
dollars. Could a judge properly base a fee award on an attorney's
normal contingency percentage? For example, if the attorney rou-
tinely takes cases on a forty percent contingency, could the judge be
right to award four million dollars in fees? The answer is "yes,"
even though, as Dawson points out, the fee awarded may bear no
relation to either the effort the attorney invested in a case or the
effective hourly rate the attorney usually earns.226 In cases waged
by contingent fee practitioners, it is inappropriate to focus on effec-
222 E. RICHARD LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES 198 (1981).
Cases applying attorneys' prevailing rates are listed in Laffey, 746 F.2d at 17 n.88.
223 See Note, supra note 26, at 461-72.
224 F.B. MACKINNON, CONnNGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 64 (1964); Kevin M.
Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529,
531 n.2 (1978).
225 Each approach has supporters. For example, in Kirchoffv. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320
(7th Cir. 1986), the district court judge had adopted the percentage found in the con-
tract signed by the plaintiffs, apparently in the belief that the percentage was reasonable
and that it reflected the attorney's normal rate. Id at 322. On appeal, Judge Easter-
brook, writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, remanded the case on the
ground that an adjusted percentage might have been deemed appropriate if the particu-
lar features of the case had been taken into account. Id at 326. Professor Coffee also
recommends adjusted percentages in class actions. Coffee, Plaintiff's Attoey, supra note
26, at 717-18. The Supreme Court requires the use of hourly rates in fee-shifting cases.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983). As indicated, however, in common fund
cases the Court appears to have endorsed the use of percentage formulas. Blum v. Sten-
son, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984).
226 For example, a $1,000,000 fee would yield an effective hourly rate of $250 if the
attorney invested 4000 hours in the case. Likewise, if 10,000 hours were invested, the
effective rate would fall to $100 per hour. The first rate might be higher than the overall
effective hourly rate a contingent fee practitioner usually earns. The second rate might
be lower.
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tive hourly rates ex post; the effective hourly rates actually earned by
contingent fee practitioners are irrelevant. What is important, from
a restitutionary perspective, is to pay attorneys on terms they would
probably accept in an ex ante bargain, before the outcome of litiga-
tion is known.
The effective hourly rate a contingent fee practitioner earns in a
given case will be higher or lower than the attorney's average effec-
tive hourly rate. An attorney's average effective hourly rate reflects
the fact that some cases require less work than others or generate
greater rewards, thus yielding relatively high hourly rates. It also
reflects the fact that other cases absorb a relatively large number of
hours or generate small awards, thus yielding low effective hourly
rates. In neither event is the result unjust from a restitutionary per-
spective. Neither an attorney nor a client has a claim of unjust en-
richment, whatever the attorney's effective hourly rate may turn out
to be in a given case, because both freely assume the risks associated
with contingent percentage fees. The situation in class actions is
analogous. When class actions settle quickly or for large amounts,
attorneys may earn extraordinarily high effective hourly rates.
When class actions become protracted or yield small settlements,
attorneys' effective hourly rates are low. 227 Even so, the result in
both contexts may be correct from a restitutionary perspective, as
long as compensation is regulated on terms attorneys would accept
if offered prior to litigation. If an attorney would have demanded a
forty percent contingency at the outset because the attorney nor-
mally represents fee-paying clients on such terms, then the fee
awarded at the conclusion of class litigation may properly reflect
that, even if the effective hourly rate seems unusually high or low.
Thus, Dawson errs in concluding that restitutionary principles
bar judges from basing fee awards on gains. Rather, restitution per-
mits such awards in cases waged by attorneys who ordinarily charge
contingent percentage fees, because percentage-based fee awards
would generally secure attorneys' hypothetical consent.228 Never-
theless, there is a widespread perception that this method results in
unnecessarily (and even unconscionably) high fee awards in cases in
which the fund recovered is extraordinarily large.229 This opinion
may reflect little more than disdain for plaintiffs' lawyers or unfamil-
iarity with the size of the cases made possible by Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Still, where class actions produce
227 Garth et al. report that class actions run by private contingent fee practitioners
have remarkably high failure rates. See Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 27, at 378-80.
228 Percentage formulas offer advantages like predictability, ease of administration,
and beneficial alignment of incentives that should not be ignored.
229 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 2.09.
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economies of scale, lawyers may be overcompensated if paid on the
basis of prevailing rates.23 0 It may also be important to spare judges
the embarrassment that large fee awards often cause. It does not
follow, however, that judges should eschew the use of percentages
altogether. Judges could simply adjust percentages to take econo-
mies of scale into account.28'
Judges cannot regulate percentages with much precision be-
cause they possess insufficient knowledge and information to assess
the economies class actions actually produce. Instead, they should
apply uniform sliding scales to all cases across the board. For exam-
ple, judges might rely solely on attorneys' prevailing percentages in
cases where less than ten million dollars is recovered. For awards
between ten and twenty million dollars, fees might be set at eighty
percent of an attorney's prevailing rate, with further reductions at
the margin for still higher recoveries. This method reserves a por-
tion of any economies for the benefit of absent plaintiffs.
The sliding scale method also has the fairness advantage of tell-
ing attorneys how their fees will be calculated in advance. 2 2
Ratemaking should not be an ad hoc procedure left to a judge's dis-
cretion. Such an approach would enable judges to punish attorneys
whom they dislike, complicate the settlement process by making it
difficult for parties to estimate plaintiffs' lawyers' legal fees, and
generate litigation. More fundamentally, it would prevent attorneys
from knowing the terms of the hypothetical bargain.238
There is no deep division between Dawson and myself. While
we differ over facts surrounding class actions, our understanding of
the law of restitution is fundamentally the same. Dawson probably
would have endorsed the practice of allowing attorneys to dip into
common funds if he had interpreted the facts as I do. Despite my
230 Id.
231 id- Relatedly, Coffee discusses the effects of fee structures on collusion in Cof-
fee, Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 26, at 717-18.
232 There is much to be said in favor of the ex ante approach taken in cases like In re
Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See THOMAS E. WILLGING,
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF ATrORNEYS' FEES: BEGINNING THE PROCESS AT PRETRIAL (1984)
(discussing pros and cons of pretrial fee guidelines).
233 The Third Circuit Task Force proposed that judges appoint representatives to
negotiate contingent fee agreements with plaintiffs' counsel on class members' behalf.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 21-24. This proposal would adequately inform
plaintiffs' counsel of the terms of representation. However, it might also be counter-
productive. If all attorneys who wished to do so were allowed to bid on class actions, the
incentive to investigate wrongdoing would be reduced, because attorneys would risk
losing cases they discovered to attorneys willing to charge lower rates. But if bargaining
were initiated after the appointment of class counsel, attorneys would lack incentives to
offer competitive rates. For an instance where a bargaining procedure like that recom-
mended by the Task Force was used, see In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 34, at 1232 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1990).
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arguments, however, Dawson would probably not alter his position
on the permissibility of percentage fees. Nevertheless, restitution-
ary principles do not entirely foreclose the option of basing fee
awards on percentages. The percentage option is appropriate
where it comes closest to securing lawyers' hypothetical consent.
IV
APPLICATIONS
Answers to many practical questions flow directly from the
restitutionary theory. Absent plaintiffs bear no personal liability for
fees because the imposition of personal liability could force them
into disadvantageous exchanges. Attorneys have restitutionary
claims against absent plaintiffs only when negotiations are impracti-
cable, not when attorneys merely fail to bargain, or attempt to bar-
gain and are rebuffed. Attorneys are entitled to be paid only when
they win because only then are absent plaintiffs enriched. Other
questions require more extended analysis. This Part will address
two issues judges now face: the permissibility of fee waiver agree-
ments in fee-shifting class actions23 4 and the propriety of enhancing
fees to offset the risk of nonpayment in class actions taken on con-
tingency.23 5 The restitutionary theory bars the use of fee waiver
agreements and supports the availability of fee enhancements.
Before elaborating on these claims, it is helpful to contrast the
restitutionary approach with the economic theory of fee awards.
Judges no longer think in restitutionary terms when considering
fees.23 6 They tend to rely on economic theories and arguments in-
stead, even to the point of building economic models of the litiga-
tion process on which to base fee award decisions. The cases
discussed in this Part, Evans v. Jeff D.237 and Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley ii),238 exemplify
judicial use of economics. At least with respect to fee awards,
judges would be wise to begin thinking again in traditional restitu-
tionary terms. In particular, they should ignore the larger social
consequences fee award decisions may have, apply standard restitu-
tionary doctrines and principles in appropriate ways, and otherwise
let the chips fall where they may. The consequences ofjudicial deci-
sions are important, but judges are more likely to produce good
consequences by doing justice on a case-by-case basis than by seek-
ing directly to benefit society at large. Although many judges try to
234 See infra subpart IV(A).
235 See infra subpart IV(B).
236 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
237 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
238 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
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anticipate the more extended consequences of their actions and take
those consequences into account when deciding cases, judges lack
the information and other resources needed to make accurate pre-
dictions. As a result, judges often make mistakes, neither helping
society at large nor even doing justice in the cases they decide. 23 9
By contrast, judges often do justice and produce desirable social
consequences when they merely recognize and enforce equitable
and legal rights in the standard common-law way, because their
decisions to reallocate resources in favor of deserving parties
encourage nonparties to act in socially desirable ways. In other
words, judges make good policies as a by-product of case-by-case
adjudication.
Reconsider the cotenancy case.240 The law entitles a cotenant
who makes an improvement to demand partition and recover the
value the improvement adds to a jointly held asset. An economist
might explain the rule by pointing out that it encourages active co-
tenants to make improvements that increase an asset's value by
more than their cost.241 The rule enables active cotenants to reap
the gains improvements produce and saddles them with the cost of
improvements that turn out to be bad bets. Because it forces active
cotenants to take both costs and benefits into account, it encourages
them to make only cost-efficient improvements. The economic anal-
ysis explains why judges' decisions in cotenancy cases might have
economically beneficial consequences for society at large, and
thereby supplies a reason for retaining the rule allowing cotenants
to recover. The economic analysis cannot, however, replace the
rule. It is one thing for judges to apply rules and principles that
have economically beneficial side-effects, but it is quite another for
239 Consider the law of standing, which restricts access to the federal courts in part
because of the fear that litigants would flood the courtrooms if no strictures were im-
posed. In fact, the available evidence suggests that relaxed standing requirements have
little effect on the workload of the courts. 3 KENNETH GULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 24.06 (2d ed. 1983). If judges err when dealing with matters of judicial
administration, they are unlikely to guess correctly when dealing with sociological mat-
ters about which they have no particular expertise.
240 See supra text accompanying note 58.
241 Law-and-economics commentators have said surprisingly little about restitution.
D. LAYcoCK, supra note 122, at 468; Levmore, supra note 25, at 69. What they have said
suggests that they would reduce the law of restitution to the incentives it creates. See,
e.g., Judge Posner's opinion in Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983)
(allowing copyright owner to recover profits in excess of loss discourages infringement
and encourages infringers to negotiate instead of bypassing markets). Levmore employs
economic reasoning, but not all of his analytical techniques are tied to an economic
theory of the law of restitution. Even if the law of restitution were to promote goals
other than efficiency, it might be sensible for the law to take valuation difficulties and
problems of wealth-dependency into account. Obstacles like these make errors likely;
they create risks that judges will fail to achieve the goals the law of restitution obligates
them to pursue. Levmore, supra note 25, at 69-79.
706 [Vol. 76:656
ATTORNEYS' FEES
them to apply economic theory directly. Suppose judges discarded
the rule and attempted to decide cotenancy cases in economically
beneficial ways. The change in styles of adjudication would add an
incredible amount of complexity to cotenancy cases. For example,
the law of restitution prevents active cotenants from holding passive
cotenants personally liable for the cost of improvements. To re-
cover, absent plaintiffs must move for partition and seek an equita-
ble division of the proceeds of sale. The law thus enables judges to
dismiss quickly any claims involving the personal liability of passive
cotenants that active cotenants might bring. By contrast, judges ap-
plying economics could not summarily reject such claims. They
would need to know the costs and benefits of a decision granting
compensation. They would need to know, for example, whether a
denial of restitution would weaken active cotenants' incentives to
make desirable improvements. The answer to that question might
be unclear. A decision to deny restitution might have little or no
measurable effect. It might even encourage cotenants to mend
relationships or to divide assets themselves, thereby avoiding
litigation.
A jurisprudence based on economics rather than rules "com-
pletely eliminates the factor which makes rules necessary, namely
judges'] ignorance." 242 Judges are not omniscient. They are no
better than the rest of us at predicting the larger social conse-
quences of actions or at ranking options according to their propen-
sity to enhance social welfare, utility, or wealth. 243 One reason why
judges should employ principles and rules as guides is "because
[they do] not know what all the consequences of a particular action
will be. ' ' 244 Even economists disagree over the consequences alter-
native legal arrangements are likely to have. Consider the matter of
contract remedies, a topic long discussed by economists of law.
Judge Posner once argued against damages in excess of expected
profits because such damages deter parties from making efficient
breaches. 245 Some other economically inclined writers dispute that
opinion,246 and Judge Posner appears to have softened his stand.
He now leaves open the possibility of applying more severe sanc-
tions in cases involving what he calls "opportunistic" breaches. 247
242 2 FRIEDRICK A. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY 20 (1976).
243 See RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALIYWITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON §§ 2,5,21 (1988).
244 F. HAYEK, supra note 242, at 20-21.
245 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-93 (2d ed. 1977).
246 Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Alan
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE LJ. 271 (1979).
247 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105 (3d ed. 1986). The change
in Posner's view is discussed in Friedmann, supra note 246, at 3-4.
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Judges are poorly placed to handle problems economists have
difficulty figuring out. With notable exceptions like Judge Posner,
they lack the requisite skills and time. Judge Posner himself has ob-
served that the pressure on federal judges to process cases is now
sufficiently extreme to threaten the quality of their decisions. 248
The recently issued Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee reiter-
ates this concern.249 Judges lack the leisure scholars have to ponder
problems at length. 250
Even ifjudges had more time, training, and resources, the bur-
den of applying economics in fee award cases would still be more
than they could bear. In The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,25 1 Pro-
fessor Lon Fuller imagined a society in which wages and prices were
set by courts. He concluded that such an arrangement would be
intolerable because "the forms of adjudication cannot encompass
and take into account the complex repercussions that may result
from any change in prices or wages." 2 52 Fuller likened an economy
to a spider's web: "A pull on one strand will distribute tensions af-
ter a complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole." 253
Judges can neither trace the economic ramifications of price and
wage changes nor maintain an economy in its optimal state.
The fundamental problem with the suggestion that judges
should apply economics in fee award cases is that it asks judges to
do what they cannot, namely, keep an economy that supplies legal
representation in balance by regulating wages. The core of the eco-
nomic approach, the idea that fee awards influence the level of liti-
gation and, ultimately, the level of respect for legal rights, may
indeed be sound. But it is preposterous to think that judges could
maintain an optimal level of respect for legal rights by fine tuning
the amounts lawyers are paid. Neitherjudges nor anyone else could
accomplish that task.
The suggestion that judges should apply restitutionary princi-
ples and rules takes into account judges' limited resources and abili-
ties. Rules reduce the number of factors judges must consider,
thereby conserving their time and enabling them to focus on infor-
mation they are likely to have at hand.2 54 The recommendation that
248 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 94-129 (1985).
249 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5-8.
250 Even if judges had more time, information shortages would often make it diffi-
cult for them to assess the larger social consequences of their decisions. Litigants rarely
have incentives to provide the information judges would need and judges lack the re-
sources to acquire it on their own.
251 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
252 Id at 394.
253 Id. at 395.
254 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 45 & n.10 (1990)
(making the point that "rules economize on information" and observing the "growing
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judges apply established rules and principles also maintains the oft-
noted tendency of the common law to accrete rules and principles
that help organize society in desirable ways.255 The common law,
which encompasses the law of restitution, grows and evolves in a
piecemeal fashion as judges decide cases. When a rule or principle
proves to have undesirable social consequences, judges can reform
it. The process is imperfect; there is no guarantee that all undesir-
able rules and principles will be weeded out. Over time, however,
the process tends to shape rules and principles in socially desirable
ways. 256 The benefit of these refinements are lost when judges for-
sake rules and principles in favor of intuitive economic reasoning
because judges are often mistaken about the way the world works.
A. Fee Waiver Agreements: Evans v. Jeff D.
In Evans v. Jeff D.,257 the Supreme Court upheld a settlement
waiving the class's right to demand a fee award from the defendants.
Because the fee award was the only potential source of compensa-
tion for the legal aid agency whose attorneys handled the case, the
decision to uphold the settlement ensured that, although the absent
plaintiffs would be enriched, no fee would be paid.
sense that the legal system has gone too far in the direction of substituting standards for
rules and is due for retrenchment"); William C. Powers, Jr., Formalism and Nonformalism
in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27 (1976) (discussing advantages of choice
of law rules that reduce the amount of information judges must consider when deciding
choice of law questions).
Consider the rule that one cotenant bears no personal liability for the cost of im-
provements made by another. There would be no need for the rule ifjudges were om-
niscient. They would always know whether a forced exchange would leave a
honimproving cotenant better off. The rule makes sense because judges possess a lim-
ited ability to reason.
Hayek, himself an economist, clearly understood the need for rules. He wrote:
Rules are a device for coping with our constitutional ignorance. There
would be no need for rules among omniscient people who were in agree-
ment on the relative importance of all the different ends. Any examina-
tion of the moral or legal order which leaves this fact out of account
misses the central problem.
F. HAYEK, supra note 242, at 8.
255 One school of thought, epitomized in the works of Hayek and Fuller, holds that
desirable rules are worked into the common law by judges who draw upon existing so-
cial practices, primarily practices relating to exchange, when deciding cases. See generally
1 FRIEDRICK A. HAYEK, RuLEs AND ORDER: LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973);
Fuller, supra note 251. Another, more economically oriented school of thought holds
that more efficient rules replace inefficient common-law rules in an essentially random
fashion over time. George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,
6J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
256 For example, the principles that governed fee awards in class actions between
1958 and 1979 appear to have produced efficient results, even though most of the pe-
riod preceded the use of explicitly economic reasoning by judges. Lynk, supra note 27,
at 256-59.
257 475 U.S. 717, rehg 7denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986).
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TheJeffD. majority never considered the justness of the result.
Instead, they asked whether fee waiver agreements would increase
the settlement rate, enhance victims' welfare and, in general, en-
courage respect for civil rights. 258 The majority concluded that fee
waiver agreements would in fact further the stated aims. No evi-
dence supported this conclusion. The Court derived its holding
from an economic model of the litigation process instead. Unfortu-
nately, there is little reason to trust either the conclusion or the
model itself. The model posits that "defendants are unlikely to
settle unless the cost of the predicted judgment, discounted by its
probability, plus the transaction costs of further litigation, are
greater than the cost of the settlement package." 259 From the
model, the majority drew the intermediate conclusion that fee waiv-
ers facilitate settlements by providing certainty and by reducing de-
fendants' costs. 2 60 The majority further opined that settlements
containing fee waiver agreements make victims better off: they
avoid delays and increase the amount of relief victims receive.261
Taking victims' welfare as the ultimate concern of the civil rights
laws, including the fee-shifting statute, the majority concluded that
use of fee waiver agreements encourages respect for civil rights and
should be approved.262
The most obvious objection to the majority's view is that per-
mitting fee waiver agreements may actually make victims worse off
on the whole by making it harder for them to find lawyers willing to
help them enforce their rights. 263 The decision may embody a trade
off: some victims, those who can sue, do better, while others, those
denied representation, do worse. The majority opinion cites no evi-
dence tending to show that the former gain more than the latter lose
and offers no guidance on how to compare the effects on the two
groups.
To be fair, the majority did point out that the plaintiffs offered
no evidence to show that the use of fee waiver agreements would
258 Id at 730-38. According to the majority, Congress wished to further these three
ends when it authorized fee-shifting in civil rights cases. Consequently, the majority
believed the same ends had to be considered when deciding whether settlements waiv-
ing fee awards could be approved.
259 Id. at 734.
260 Id. at 734-36.
261 Id. at 741.
262 Id. at 741-42.
263 This objection appears in a number of places. Id. at 754-64 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Steven Goldstein, Settlement Offers Contingent upon Waiver of Attorney Fees: A Continuing
Dilemma After Evans v. Jeff D., 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 693, 698 (Oct. 1986); Geoffrey
Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 208 (1987); Note, Waive
Goodbye to Law in the Public Interest-The Use of Coercive Fee Waivers in Civil Rights Actions,
Evans v.JeffD., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749 (1987) (authored by David
Enzminger).
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diminish lawyers' willingness to take civil rights cases. 264 But if the
Court should ignore unsupported concerns, then the majority broke
its own rule. No evidence supported the majority's assertion that
"there surely is a significant number" of cases that will settle only if
fee waivers are permitted.265 Nor did any evidence prove the accu-
racy of the economic model of the decision to litigate or settle.266
The majority adopted these views because they seemed sensible, not
because evidence showed them to be correct. If good sense is
enough, though, the complaint that fee waivers may discourage law-
yers from taking civil rights cases cannot be denied. Fee waivers
that prevent lawyers from being paid weaken lawyers' incentives to
protect victims' rights.267 If the majority can properly invoke low-
level economic intuitions, so can the dissent.
If both sides employ economic arguments based on intuition,
the correct outcome remains a mystery. In the absence of informa-
tion on the extent to which fee waivers deter lawyers from taking
civil rights cases, one cannot know whether fee waivers make victims
as a group better or worse off. If fee waivers "seriously impair the
ability of civil rights plaintiffs to obtain legal assistance," as Justice
Brennan feared,268 then the Court should prohibit them. But if law-
yers' willingness to take civil rights cases remains largely intact, as
the majority believed, 269 the Court should permit fee waiver agree-
ments. Finally, if the supply of representation shrinks by only a mid-
dling amount, it may be impossible to know whether the use of fee
waiver agreements raises or lowers respect for civil rights on the
whole.270
264 JeffD., 475 U.S. at 741 n.34.
265 Id at 734.
266 The accuracy of the model is in fact the subject of disagreement. The nature of
the disagreement and some empirical evidence are discussed in Linda Stanley & Don
Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19J.
LEGAL STUD. 145 (1990). '
267 The view that fee awards motivate attorneys' behavior is a fundamental tenet of
the economic analysis of law. See Miller, supra note 263 (example of the standard eco-
nomic approach). The empirical evidence suggests that the effects fees have on lawyers
are often more subtle than one would initially suspect. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641 (1987); Garth,
Nagel & Plager, supra note 27; Stewart Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Consti-
tutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defen-
dant, 73 CORNEtLL L. REv. 719 (1988). The difficulty of predicting how lawyers will
respond to incentives is especially great in class actions, as John Coffee's work in-
sightfully reveals. See articles cited supra note 26.
268 JefD., 475 U.S. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
269 Id at 741 n.34.
270 The truth does in fact appear to fall somewhere between the extremes. My pre-
liminary research on the actual affect of theJeffD. decision suggests that plaintiffs' law-
yers have developed a number of strategies to protect themselves and enjoy
considerable, though far from uniform, success. My research consists of questionnaires
7111991]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
The Court's conclusion that fee waiver agreements make vic-
tims better off is, then, entirely conjectural. So is the claim that fee
waivers facilitate settlements. Neither the parties nor the Court
offered any evidence to support that claim, and the model of the
litigation process on which it was based was radically incomplete.
Although both sides must agree to a settlement, the court's model
considered only the effects fee waiver agreements have on
defendants.
Class actions are often lawyers' cases, 271 as Jeff D. evidently
was. 272 Moreover, plaintiffs' lawyers generally dislike fee waiver and
fee reduction demands, as the lawyers who ran Jeff D. evidently
did.27s Such demands may therefore alienate plaintiffs' lawyers and
retard the settlement process. If plaintiffs' lawyers regard fee waiver
and fee reduction demands as hostile acts, as signs that their oppo-
nents are failing to cooperate or are attempting to manipulate them
in strategic or opportunistic ways, they may deem it wise to respond
in kind.274 For example, they may expand the scope of litigation,
move for summary judgment, or take cases to trial. They may refuse
to cooperate on the timing of depositions and may contest requests
for extensions. They may propound expensive discovery requests
or attempt to embarrass defendants in the press. Plaintiffs' lawyers
can make life difficult for defendants and defense counsel. They
often refrain from doing so because as a general matter it is to their
advantage to cooperate. But removing the incentive to cooperate
may cause cooperation to cease. Instead of greasing the gears, fee
waiver and fee reduction demands may cause them to grind.275
submitted to and interviews with civil rights attorneys at the 1989 NAACP LDF Lawyers'
Training Institute.
271 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 263, at 213-14 (In class actions and derivative suits,
"Ct]he attorney exercises virtually plenary control over the litigation, including the deci-
sion whether to settle.").
272 JeffD. was a lawyers' case. The lawyers, not the absent plaintiffs, kept the fee
waiver issue alive by appealing the decision of the district court. The absent plaintiffs
had no interest in challenging the waiver.
273 See Christopher T. Lutz, Planning Fees Fights, 13 LITIGATION 41, 41 (Fall 1986)
(commenting on the emotional intensity of fee disputes). Perhaps the best evidence in
support of the claim that plaintiffs' lawyers dislike fee waivers and reductions is the fact
that the civil rights bar has strongly supported the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990,
which would have undone the decision inJeffD. See supra note 132. Civil rights lawyers
at the 1989 NAACP LDF Lawyers' Training Institute indicated to me that they have
begun to screen clients more carefully and to use other methods to protect their claims
to fees.
274 In effect, lawyers adopt tit-for-tat strategies of the sort commonly employed in
iterated games. See ROBERT AxELROD, THE EvoLUTIoN OF COOPERATION (1984) (discuss-
ing use of computer program, "Trr FOR TAT," in the game of iterated Prisoner's Di-
lemma); see also John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation,
Nuclear Deterrence and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U.L. REv. 569 (1989) (discussing opportunities
for strategizing in the discovery process and using the theory of games).
275 Geoffrey Miller points out that "[llitigation is a form of bilateral monopoly," and
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The claim that fee waiver agreements facilitate settlements is
thus entirely speculative. Although settlements occur when defend-
ants and plaintiffs bargain to agreement, the model offered by the
majority examined fee waiver agreements from only the defendant's
perspective. There is no reason to think predictions based on the
model are right.
What of the claim that fee waiver agreements make plaintiffs
better off by enabling them to trade fee entitlements for additional
merits-based relief? That claim also rests on debatable empirical as-
sumptions,276 but for the sake of argument I will assume the claim is
correct. The more important question is "So what?" Plaintiffs
would always be better off if they could keep money that is ordinar-
ily paid to lawyers as fees or use that money to purchase additional
concessions from defendants. Lawyers' fees always reduce the value
of the benefits plaintiffs receive, but even so, lawyers are paid.
Suppose that after a class won a damage award of ten million
dollars, an absent plaintiff appeared in court and asked that no fees
be paid to the attorneys who handled the case. The reason? The
absent plaintiffs would be better off if they kept the entire ten mil-
lion dollars for themselves. Surely the argument would fall on deaf
ears. Judges have never regarded the fact that fee awards diminish
absent plaintiffs' gains as a reason for denying fees entirely. They
have considered it a reason for exercising caution and moderation
instead. Their attitude is correct. Withholding fees entirely in suc-
cessful damages class actions would unjustly enrich absent plaintiffs
at their attorneys' expense.
The concern for absent plaintiffs' welfare is no weightier in in-
junctive class actions likeJeffD. than in damages cases. An attorney
who helps a group of plaintiffs secure a package of injunctive re-
forms thereby makes the plaintiffs better off. Consequently, the
concept of justice embodied in the law of restitution requires the
plaintiffs to offer something of appropriate value in return. The ob-
ligation of paying fees makes the absent plaintiffs worse off, but
even so the obligation remains. Unfortunately, the decision inJeffD.
had the effect of canceling the absent plaintiffs' obligation outright.
that "[b]ilateral monopoly allows strategic or gaming behavior" that may often frustrate
settlements "even though settlement would be in the interests of both parties." Miller,
supra note 263, at 193. Plaintiffs' lawyers may regard fee waiver demands as strategic or
gaming behavior and may respond with maneuvers of their own.
276 One assumption is that defendants actually offer additional relief in return for
fee waiver agreements, instead of making such demands simply to put plaintiffs' lawyers
in an ethical box. Another assumption is that the prospect of having to waive fees has no
effect on the zealousness with which an attorney negotiates on behalf ofa class. If that is
not so, a policy permitting the use of fee waiver agreements may diminish the amount of
relief class members receive.
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The plaintiffs inJeffD. had only the right to a fee award to offer as
compensation. The fee waiver agreement placed that right beyond
the attorney's reach. It enabled the plaintiffs to trade the money the
right might have generated for additional injunctive reforms from
the defendant. That settlement does not differ in practical effect
from the absent plaintiffs' request to keep the whole common fund
in the damages action example set out above. Since the latter ar-
rangement violates the restitutionary theory, fee waivers in injunc-
tive class actions do so as well.
That a group of plaintiffs would be better off if allowed to keep
monies earmarked for their lawyers does not excuse the plaintiffs'
obligation to pay. Nor does the possibility that plaintiffs could use
fee waivers to secure additional merits-based relief. Once one
determines that an obligation to pay exists because plaintiffs have
been enriched at their lawyers' expense, it matters little that plain-
tiffs would be better off if they could escape the obligation. People
often find obligations disagreeable, but obligations are nonetheless
enforced.
Admittedly, a timing difference distinguishesJeffD from the hy-
pothetical damages class action. In the hypothetical, the fee waiver
request arose after the class acquired the common fund, that is, after
the class was enriched. InJeffD., the fee waiver provision was part
of the settlement that enriched the class. In other words, the class
waived fees and gained enrichment at the same time. Because obli-
gations to pay usually arise only after benefits are received, it is pos-
sible to argue that a fee waiver would violate the class's obligation in
the example but not inJeffD.
The timing difference is a red herring. A judge presented with
a settlement containing a fee waiver provision has two options. The
judge can approve the proposal and leave the plaintiffs' lawyer un-
paid or the judge can direct the parties to negotiate a new agree-
ment that provides for a reasonable fee. By selecting the first
option, a judge brings about a state of affairs in which a class is un-
justly enriched at an attorney's expense. 277 By choosing the second
option, a judge ensures that a class, when enriched, will pay a rea-
sonable fee.278 A judge, therefore, can help foster a distributively
just state of affairs. Given that, it follows that ajudge should choose
277 I am assuming here that the lawyer involved in a case does not wish to donate his
or her time to a class. Nothing I have said prohibits the use of fee waiver agreements in
cases where attorneys voluntarily renounce their claims to compensation.
278 1 recognize that it may sometimes be difficult to settle class actions unless fees
are waived or greatly reduced, because fees may constitute the largest part of a defend-
ant's liability. However, I am not yet convinced that an exception for such cases should
be carved into the general rule. An exception would invite litigation over the proper
classification of a case and foster an environment of uncertainty that would not, in all
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the second option because of the impropriety of using judicial pow-
ers to promote distributive injustice.
The foregoing conclusion comports with both the language and
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976,279 ("Fees Act") the statute that authorized fee shifting in
Jeff D. The statutory language neither endorses the use of fee
waiver agreements nor rules them out. The legislative history
makes no mention of fee waivers either,280 but it does say that Con-
gress enacted the Fees Act to undo the Supreme Court's decision in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.28 ' That case barred
lower court judges from using their equitable powers to hold de-
fendants liable for plaintiffs' fees in the absence of statutory authori-
zation.28 2 By enacting the Fees Act, Congress sought to restore the
power Alyeska took away. It therefore follows that judges can use
their equitable powers to prohibit fee waiver agreements in cases
likeJeffD. Prior to Alyeska, judges shifted fee liability for two rea-
sons: to encourage lawyers to act as private attorneys general and
to cure unjust enrichment in cases that produced no common
funds. 28 3 Alyeska left both desires intact. It merely forbade judges
from using defendants' money to satisfy those desires in the absence
of statutory authorization. Because the Fees Act authorized fee
shifting inJeffD., the Court was free to use the defendants' funds to
prevent the absent plaintiffs from being unjustly enriched. But if
the Court could put its equitable powers into play, then it could also
have used those powers to prevent unjust enrichment by invalidat-
ing the fee waiver agreement. 28 4
B. Fee Enhancements: Delaware Valley II
InJeffD., the Court engaged in empirical theorizing on a grand
scale. In Delaware Valley 11285 the Justices counseled district court
likelihood, be conducive to the settlement of disputes. Judges should therefore not gen-
erally permit fee waiver agreements over attorneys' objections in class actions.
279 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
280 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th 'Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976); see also Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 748-51 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative history of
42 U.S.C. § 1988).
281 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
282 Id. at 268-71.
283 Dawson, supra note 20, at 888-907; Dawson, Fees from Funds, supra note 21, at
1601-12.
284 It is worth noting that both houses of Congress approved legislation, the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, that would have undone the decision inJeffD. as it applies to em-
ployment discrimination cases, had President Bush signed it into law. It is therefore
difficult to make a convincing argument that a decision to prohibit fee waiver agree-
ments in all fee-shifting cases would violate congressional intent.
285 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
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judges to do the same. The Court heard Delaware Valley Ii to decide
whether a district court judge abused his discretion by enhancing a
lodestar fee award to account for the risk of nonpayment. In a 4-4-1
decision, with Justice O'Connor casting the swing vote, the Court
upheld the use of contingency enhancements in general286 but in-
validated the specific enhancement applied in the case. 28 7
According to Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which lower
court judges appear to regard as establishing the law of the case,28 8
the general use of contingency enhancements is permissible because
markets often reward attorneys for risks.289 However, the contin-
gency premium attorneys receive may vary from case to case and
from market to market. Consequently, ajudge must identify the size
of the contingency premium paid in a relevant market for a particu-
lar kind of case before applying a contingency enhancement to the
lodestar. Unfortunately, the district court judge who handled Dela-
ware Valley I1 failed to make the necessary findings. The judge par-
ticularly erred by failing to find that the enhancement granted was
no larger "than necessary to bring the fee within the range that
would attract competent counsel." 290 Justice O'Connor therefore
concluded that no risk enhancement could be allowed in the case.
Federal judges handling fee-shifting class actions after Delaware
Valley II must speculate about several empirical matters. They must
define relevant markets, assess the contingency premiums paid in
those markets, and identify the smallest enhancements sufficient to
entice attorneys to handle class actions.291 It is obvious that federal
judges will have great difficulty completing these tasks and that their
decisions will be unreliable. In Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp.,292 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the task of defining
286 Id. at 731-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
287 Id. at 734.
288 See King v. Palmer, 906 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (adopting the two-part test
suggested byJustice O'Connor); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 379 (3d Cir.
1987).
289 Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
290 Id. Justice O'Connor thus agreed with the plurality led by Justice White that "no
enhancement for risk is appropriate unless the applicant can establish that without an
adjustment for risk the prevailing party 'would have faced substantial difficulties in find-
ing counsel in the local or other relevant market.' "Id (quoting opinion of White, J., id.
at 731).
291 It may even be that judges must define one market for the purpose of determin-
ing the contingency premium and a second market for the purpose of assessing the
availability of representation for a particular kind of case. Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp.,
702 F. Supp. 493, 498 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 888 F.2d 975 (3d Cir.
1989); H. NEWBERG, supra note I, § 32.09.
292 In Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1987), the court wrote
that:
[The presentation required by [Delaware Valley II] will most certainly re-
quire expert testimony from someone familiar with the economics of the
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markets requires judges to hear expert testimony on the means by
which plaintiffs secure legal assistance. To determine the size of
contingency premiums paid in markets, judges will have to model
markets in some way. To decide how large enhancements must be
to enable potential plaintiffs to find representation, judges will have
to estimate the supply curve for legal services. Each assessment will
be expensive and time consuming to make, and each will necessarily
be imprecise.293
The matter of identifying prevailing contingency premiums is
actually even more difficult than the Third Circuit realized. Premi-
ums paid in markets reflect both the risk that plaintiffs will lose, in
which event no fees are paid, and the risk that plaintiffs will win
amounts too small to compensate attorneys adequately for the time
they invested in litigation.29 Statutory fee award cases do not pres-
ent the latter risk because, upon winning these cases, plaintiffs' at-
torneys are fully compensated for all hours reasonably invested,
regardless of the amount a plaintiff receives.295 In order to fine tune
the fee award process, one must determine the portion of the pre-
vailing contingency premium that reflects only the risk that the cli-
ent will lose. It would be wrong to apply the full prevailing
premium as the Third Circuit mistakenly believed.
29 6
Why strive for such precision? Delaware Valley II aims (if a deci-
sion consisting of two plurality opinions and a concurrence can be
said to have an aim) to encourage judges to stimulate the supply of
legal profession. It may also be that an expert economist will be re-
quired, even one able to develop some kind of econometric model....
Performance of [the required] study would inevitably run into the
tens of thousands of dollars, and there would thus be few cases in which
the value of the multiple would justify plaintiff's lawyers in investing in
such research.
Even more problematic is the fact that such a study would address
only one side ofJustice O'Connor's inquiry, for it says nothing about the
question whether the multiple is necessary to attract competent counsel.
How that question is to be answered-short of estimating the supply
curve for plaintiff's legal services in these cases-is equally unclear. An
econometric answer here would also be extremely expensive.
Id. at 380-81 (citation omitted).
The Third Circuit also noted (1) that because "the district court's determination of
how the market compensates for contingency... will control future cases involving the
same market," the due process rights of attorneys who file fee petitions in the future
might be violated unless they were allowed to intervene; and (2) that the district could
should consider appointing a "standing master to develop findings about contingency
cases in its geographical area." Id at 381.
293 In Blum, 702 F. Supp. 493, the plaintiffs' attorneys presented evidence showing
that an econometric study would cost about $17,600. Thejudge concluded that to con-
duct such a study would be impractical. Id at 498.
294 id at 494.
295 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
296 Blum, 829 F.2d at 380 n.14.
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representation to just the right extent. Fee awards must be large
enough to attract competent counsel but no larger, on the theory
that judges should not award windfall fees. 297
Although attorneys should not be overpaid, the marginal price
of exactness exceeds the benefit. Attorneys and clients bargaining
over fees often spend little time negotiating. They realize that the
cost of fine tuning compensation agreements quickly becomes ex-
cessive. The same holds true for the fee award process. Considera-
ble room for error in the form of underpayments and overpayments
will remain no matter how the process is designed. It is therefore
absurd to insist on precision. The most one can reasonably demand
is a reasonably accurate procedure that is easy to apply.
That is the kind of procedure judges would devise if they were
to adopt a restitutionary point of view. They would begin by asking
whether enhancements are needed to secure attorneys' hypothetical
consent. The answer must assuredly be "yes," for the simple reason
that a sure bet is worth more than an uncertain bet of equal size.298
Suppose an attorney regularly receives $200 per hour from reliable
clients in noncontingent cases. Would a payment of $200 an hour
on a contingency basis be sufficient to purchase the lawyer's hypo-
thetical consent? Presumably not. Given the risk of nonpayment
(the risk of losing) the offer would generate an expected fee of less
than $200 per hour. There would be reason to believe that the law-
yer would have declined the offer had it been presented at the be-
ginning of the case. 299
To duplicate the fees lawyers normally accept, judges must ap-
ply contingency enhancements, but only when the risk of nonpay-
ment is real. If a plaintiff were to agree to bear the entire expense of
a class action, win or lose, the lawyer's fee would be guaranteed. In
that event, the fee award should reflect only the lawyer's normal
hourly rate in noncontingent cases.3 00
In Delaware Valley H, Justice White opposed contingency en-
hancements for three reasons. First, they "force[] losing defendants
to compensate plaintiff's lawyers for not prevailing against defend-
297 This sentiment is expressed most clearly in Part IV of Justice White's plurality
opinion. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 726-27. Justice O'Connor did not join Justice
White on this matter. Even so, the tenor of her opinion suggests that she shares his
view. Id. at 733.
298 For example, the expected value of a $100 bet with a 100% chance of success is
$100. The expected value of a $100 bet with only a 50% chance of success is $50.
299 To be clear, I am not claiming that hourly rate practitioners would decline to
take class actions if no risk-of-loss enhancements were applied, however plausible that
prediction might be. I claim only that it is fair to apply risk-of-loss enhancements be-
cause it is necessary to do so to bring fees in contingent fee cases in line with fees hourly
rate practitioners ordinarily receive.
300 Justice Blackmun made this point in Delaware Valley II. 483 U.S. at 748.
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ants in other cases," a state of affairs he found inconsistent "with
Congress' decision to adopt the rule that only prevailing parties are
entitled to fees."30' Second, although "some lawyers [would] de-
cline to take cases" if enhancements were unavailable, there was lit-
tle likelihood "that the bar in general [would] so often be unable to
respond that the goal of the fee-shifting statutes [would] not be
achieved." 30 2 Finally, "[t]here are... severe difficulties and possi-
ble inequities involved in making upward adjustments for assuming
the risk of nonpayment." 303 In other words, even if contingency en-
hancements are justified in theory, judges would have difficulty reg-
ulating them appropriately in practice. 30 4
Justice White's second objection is a good example of empirical
speculation.30 5 Instead of asking whether a contingency enhance-
ment was needed to do justice in Delaware Valley 11, he opined on the
effects a policy withholding enhancements would have on society at
large. There is simply no reason to trustJustice White's impression.
He may "doubt" that the bar will often fail to respond, but his opin-
ion is pure conjecture.306
Justice White's first objection makes better sense, but it too ulti-
mately fails. It is somewhat anomalous to charge defendants more
because plaintiffs' lawyers receive nothing when they lose. Why
should losing defendants suffer because plaintiffs' lawyers some-
times wage ill-advised suits? The law of restitution provides a clear
answer. A fee award should mirror the amount a plaintiffs' lawyer
301 Id. at 725; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 489 ("the contingency bonus is
extracted from [a] defendant in order to reward the plaintiff's bar for bringing similar
but unsuccessful suits against other defendants").
302 Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 727. The goal of fee-shifting statutes is "to make it
possible for those who cannot pay a lawyer for his time and effort to obtain competent
counsel." Id. at 725. Justice White's reasons for thinking that the goal would be served
without risk-of-loss enhancements are (1) that some wealthy plaintiffs agree to pay law-
yers win or lose, thereby eliminating the risk of loss in those cases; (2) that some plain-
tiffs have damages claims large enough to attract lawyers even in the absence of fee-
shifting; (3) that some plaintiffs are represented by legal aid lawyers whose decisions to
take cases turn on factors other than fees; and (4) that unemployed and underemployed
lawyers would take cases without risk-of-loss enhancements. Id. at 726.
303 Id. at 728.
304 This is how Justice O'Connor interpreted Justice White's remark. Id at 732
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
305 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, responded in kind. He predicted that a policy
barring contingency enhancements would deter lawyers from taking statutory fee award
cases. Id. at 737-42. Justice Blackmun thus continued the tradition of applying econom-
ics from the bench. See also id. at 741 (discussing the law of supply and demand).
306 Justice White carelessly relied on Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at several points for
support. Leubsdorf repeatedly declined to speculate about the affects risk-of-loss en-
hancements have on lawyers' willingness to take cases. See Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at
496 n.102, 507, 511, 512. "Legal reasoning cannot specify the precise effect of any fee
award or practice on the amount of litigation that will be brought in the future." Id. at
512.
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ordinarily receives because of the reasonable inference that a lawyer
would accept a usual and customary fee if a plaintiff class were to
offer it in advance. The goal is not to compensate lawyers for cases
they lose, but to duplicate bargains plaintiffs and lawyers actually
strike when they negotiate over fees face-to-face.
Justice White's third objection has the most force. Even if it
would be sensible in theory to grant contingency enhancements, it
must also be shown that judges can actually apply enhancements in
an acceptable way. With respect to this claim, my position resem-
bles Justice White's. I have already said that judges should employ
fee award procedures that are simple and routine. Therefore, if
judges cannot assess contingency enhancements simply, objectively,
and matter-of-factly, they should not do so at all.3 0 7
In my judgment, the desire for simple procedures rules out the
possibility that judges might tailor contingency enhancements case
by case. To permit judges to do so would place unlimited discretion
in their hands and require them to make extensive factual inquiries.
Moreover, it is preposterous to think that judges could accurately
assess case-specific risks. Judges cannot mimic markets precisely.
At best, they can make only crude guesses about risks and the com-
pensation lawyers considering risky cases would demand.308
Given the theoretical propriety of contingency enhancements
and the need for simple, objective procedures that can be applied
routinely in cases across the board, judges should double all hourly-
rate based fee awards in class actions.30 9 This rule is attractive in
part because it eliminates the need for factual inquiries, limits
judges' discretion, and yields predictable results. The rule can also
be defended in a theoretical way. Although judges can be confident
that attorneys incur a risk of nonpayment whenever class actions are
brought, judges cannot assess the riskiness of any given class action
or the average level of risk in class actions across the board. Nor can
they assess marginal differences in lawyers' attitudes toward risk.
Given their ignorance, the best they can do is assume that victory
and defeat are equally likely ex ante and that lawyers are risk-
neutral.3 10 Judges should therefore set the risk of nonpayment at
307 Justice O'Connor made this point persuasively when criticizing Justice Black-
mun's dissent. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 732.
308 Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 485-88.
309 See King v. Palmer, 906 F.2d 762, 766-67 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (employing this ap-
proach); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 511-12 (same proposal defended on differ-
ent grounds). Leubsdorf also proposes that the actual rate of success in litigation be
studied and that the size of risk-of-loss enhancements be based on the results. Id at
507-10. Implementation of this proposal exceeds the capacity of a court. Unless and
until Congress, an administrative office, or a research center conducts such a study and
keeps it current, judges should simply double fee awards.
310 The intuition behind my proposal is similar to that embodied in
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0.5 and should double fee awards to offset that risk.311
CONCLUSION
The restitutionary theory entitles attorneys to compensation for
the value of their time when their efforts benefit the members of a
class and when the other requirements built into the theory are met.
The theory thus develops in a rich way the idea of unjust enrichment
that once served as the basis for fee awards but that has largely dis-
appeared from current doctrine. The theory also has bite. It can
help judges handle fee award problems that exist today.
The number and variety of fee award issues that can and do
arise are, of course, far too great to treat in a single essay. So are
the difficulties that may afflict the restitutionary theory itself. More
conditions may need to be added to the theory, and the conditions
already set out may need to be refined. My aims here have largely
been to define the terms of future discussion by emphasizing differ-
ences between the restitutionary and economic theories of attor-
neys' fees in class actions and to clarify and defend the general
structure of the restitutionary approach. Toward those ends, I hope
that I have taken a step in the direction of greater clarity in fee
award law.
[t]he principle of insufficient reason first formulated by Jacob Bernoulli
... , [which] states in boldest terms that, if there is no evidence leading
one to believe that one event from an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive
events is more likely to occur than another, then the events should be
judged equally probable.
ROBERT DUNCAN LUCE & HowARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 284 (1957).
As Luce and Raiffa discuss, there is disagreement over the propriety of using the
principle of insufficient reason as a basis for choice. Many of the problems they raise
affect only the use of the principle by ideally rational choosers; fewer difficulties are
encountered by real persons who make choices on the basis of limited rationality and in
the face of significant informational constraints.
311 For example, assuming risk neutrality, to equal a guaranteed fee of $200 for an
hour of work, the fee offered in a contingency arrangement where the odds of prevailing
are 0.5 must equal $400 ($200 = 0.5($400)).
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